

GREAT POWER CONCERT: COMPETITION, COOPERATION, AND STABILITY
IN EAST AFRICA

BY
MAJOR JASON R. HERRING

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MARK O. YEISLEY

(Date)

JAMES M. TUCCI

(Date)

DISCLAIMER

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or Air University.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Jason Herring is a senior pilot with over 3,700 flying hours in the T-1, C-130E/H, and KC-10. He was commissioned through the Reserve Officer Training Corps at The University of Virginia in 1999. After receiving a commission, Major Herring attended Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training at Columbus Air Force Base, Mississippi. Upon graduation, he returned to the 48th Flying Training Squadron as an instructor pilot in the T-1. In 2004, Major Herring transitioned to fly the C-130 in the 2d Airlift Squadron at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina. In 2007, he was selected for Air Mobility Command's Phoenix Reach program and cross-flowed into the KC-10 at Travis Air Force Base, California. During his assignment at Travis, Major Herring flew in the 6th Air Refueling Squadron and was the Chief of Command Post for the 60th Air Mobility Wing. In 2011, he was selected to attend the Naval Command and Staff College at Newport, Rhode Island. He has deployed on five occasions in support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM flying over 1150 combat hours, delivering troops, supplies, and fuel. He has a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering from the University of Virginia, a master's degree in Business Administration from Liberty University, and a master's degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval Command and Staff College. Upon graduation from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Major Herring is slated for an assignment on the Headquarters Air Force Staff.

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Fourth, although you will not find his name mentioned in this paper, the inspiration for the concept of this thesis came from the work of John Marks, the founder of the Search for Common Ground. After serving in the US State Department he attempted to create a cooperative effort with the Soviet Union against terrorism amidst the height of the Cold War. His vision that great powers could overcome adversarial differences for the greater good provided the overall concept that a cooperative effort between the United States and China could exist. As I researched John Marks' work along with the efforts of the RAND Corporation, the trail of successful great power cooperation went cold. Unfortunately the United States and the Soviet Union could not settle the dilemma that one state's terrorist is another state's freedom fighter.

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ABSTRACT

The interaction between the United States and China is likely to be the most critical international relationship over the next century. As China continues its rise and threatens to shift the international system towards a bipolar world, American politicians are waiting to uncover China's intentions. Current hawkish rhetoric and the expansion of military capabilities by both sides, portray a deterministic view of an inevitable great power war. Although the United States has maintained a policy of engagement with China, there is talk of attempts to contain the developing state. Unfortunately, any attempts by the United States to contain China's expansion or stunt its economic growth are not only likely to fail but could force the states into a violent conflict. The United States and China need to establish confidence-building measures through cooperation to better comprehend each state's intentions. If both states desire influence and greater development in the international system, each must find common ground with the other.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the potential for great power cooperation focused on stability and development in East Africa. This area provides greater opportunity for common ground because it is outside of the two great powers' main spheres of influence, requires outside assistance to maintain regional stability, and has a significant potential for economic growth. A cooperative effort such as this, could not only help diffuse the tensions between the two states, but also improve the livelihood of East Africans while increasing potential gains for American and Chinese interests. This paper develops a cooperative framework based on three main pressures which influence a political leader's decision to enter a cooperative agreement—domestic will, interstate relations, and international image. This framework is tested through the examination of the cooperative failure between the United States and France to prevent the genocide in Rwanda. It is then used to forecast the potential for a cooperative effort between China and the United States today. The ultimate outcome of this analysis is that the timing is right and the interests of the two great powers align in the region to allow a cooperative effort to take place.

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Introduction

“Whether for good or ill, the most significant bilateral international relationship over the course of the next several decades is likely to be that between the United States and the PRC (People’s Republic of China).”

Aaron Friedberg, *The Future of U.S.-China Relations*

Our relationship with China must therefore be multidimensional and undergirded by a process of enhancing confidence and reducing mistrust in a manner that reinforces mutual interests. The United States and China should sustain open channels of communications to discuss disagreements in order to manage and ultimately reduce the risks of conflict that are inherent in any relationship as broad and complex as that shared by these two nations.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 2010

The major debate in the United States’ shift to Asia is whether to view China as a threat or a potential ally in an ever changing international environment. As China develops, its massive increase in military spending, ballistic missile development, and the offensive rhetoric of the leaders of the People’s Liberation Army highlight a potential for aggression develops. “Military doctrines and capabilities are hard to hide,” Barry Posen explained, “but the political intentions that lie behind the military preparations are obscure.”¹ China’s unwillingness to explain the long-term aims of its military modernization programs instills a lack of transparency towards its intentions.² As China continues to expand the size of its military and modernizes its technology, United States leaders need to develop a relatively accurate assessment of China’s intentions. As a hegemon, it is in the United States’ interests to sustain international order and promote stability among any rising powers. The best way to understand China’s intentions is to establish a number of confidence building measures through cooperation.

If the United States and China properly nurture an interest-based relationship, a cooperative effort could help sustain global stability. There are many areas in which Chinese and American interests coincide outside of the Pacific region. As an example,

¹ Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 16.

² Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Report* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2010), 31.

East Africa is of significant value to both great powers. From 2000 to 2010 the United States sent more foreign aid to East Africa than any other region on the continent.³ In 2010, the combined total of this assistance exceeded \$2.1 billion in foreign grants and credits, which was 5.8% of the total United States foreign aid distributed globally.⁴ Additionally, during General Carter Ham’s meeting before the House Armed Services Committee in February of 2012, he stated, “our (United States Africa Command) highest priority is the East Africa region which is the nexus for transnational threats to our nation’s security . . . a safe, secure, and stable Africa is in our national interest. . . .”⁵

Long-term stability and development in the region are major interests for China as well. Steven Kuo stated that “As China has risen, its importance for Africa as a trading partner and political ally has grown greatly.”⁶ Increasing finds of oil, natural gas, and other resources in East Africa are boosting the region’s strategic significance to both great powers. A large part of China’s interests in the region are based on the extraction of resources. The Chinese government bases its national security on “privileged access to oil” and its relationship with developing oil-producing countries on the African continent.⁷ The current cycle of instability in East Africa, which is driven by population growth, a lack of food security, poor governance, and violent conflict, threatens resource extraction and economic growth in the region. A cooperative effort based on building stability and development is not only beneficial to the individual states, but it would advance the economic and diplomatic interests of the two great powers. Additionally, East Africa is outside the United States and China’s main spheres of influence, which reduces the potential for significant territorial or political disputes.

³ Data extrapolated for countries in East Africa region from U.S. Census Bureau, “Table 1297. U.S. Government Foreign Grants and Credits by Type and Country: 2000 to 2010,” <http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1297.pdf> (accessed 10 December 2012).

⁴ Data extracted by totaling grants and credits given globally and calculating the percentage given to countries in the East African region, “Table 1297. U.S. Government Foreign Grants and Credits by Type and Country: 2000 to 2010.”

⁵ United States Africa Command, *Statement of General Carter Ham: United States Africa Command before the House Armed Services Committee*, 29 February 2012, 5, <http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/testHam04052011.pdf>.

⁶ Steven C. Y. Kuo, “Beijing’s Understanding of African Security: Context and Limitations,” *African Security* 5, no. 1 (Jan-Mar 2012): 31.

⁷ Chris Alden et al., *China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace* (New York: Columbia University, 2008), 92.

The dilemma with China’s rise brings about several key questions. With fiscal constraints mounting, how does the United States continue to maintain international stability? Are there areas of potential cooperation between the United States and China that link the two great powers’ interests and international stability? Can a cooperative effort outside of the Pacific region defuse tensions between the United States and China? Are there signs that such an effort is worth diplomatic pursuit? The central argument presented in this paper is that a cooperative effort to improve stability in the East African region provides a nexus between Chinese and American interests and the potential to defuse underlying tensions. Before examining the feasibility of this concept, it is important to conceptualize other United States’ options for dealing with China’s rising status in the international community.

The Hegemonic Debate

In order to assess the different foreign policy options available to American leaders, one needs to define the current international order and characterize the role the United States plays in maintaining it. Hegemony, as defined by Robert Keohane, is a “preponderance of material resources,” thereby, “hegemonic powers must have control over raw materials, control over sources of capital, control over markets, and competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods.”⁸ Although China, the world’s second largest great power, is rising, few can deny that the United States still meets this definition of a hegemonic power. In terms of influence, the definition of hegemony put forth by the Greeks, referred to the “leadership of one state (the hegemon) over other states in the system.”⁹ While the international system is anarchic, the United States has wielded the greatest influence on international issues since the demise of the USSR.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has maintained a military and economic might unmatched by any other state in the past three centuries with almost no significant recent challenges to its power.¹⁰ It may seem counterintuitive, but in

⁸ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 32.

⁹ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (1981; repr., Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 116.

¹⁰ G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 10.

maintaining power and influence over the long-term, the United States has given up some of its control through international institutions and alliances. Establishing international institutions like the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization during the post-World War II era, the United States dispersed some power while still maintaining its dominant role in sustaining international order. In doing so, the state circumvented one of Kenneth Waltz's principle arguments of his balance-of-power theory that weaker states would align with other weaker states rather than bandwagon with a dominant power.¹¹ The expansion of democracies and self-imposed restraint of United States power enabled the sustainment of the current international order. The United States utilizes a blend of military force, a robust economy, and advanced technology to maintain hegemonic control through John Ikenberry's dualistic mechanism of "direct coercion" and indirect "carrots and sticks."¹²

Although this approach was effective immediately following the Cold War, the international environment and the United States' position has changed significantly in the twenty-first century. Fiscal constraints combined with significant global issues do not allow American leaders to pursue all of their interests. Although force has always been a tool of American policy, Posen noted, "the last years of Bill Clinton's administration saw the emergence of a strategy that also depended heavily on military power, but which was more multilateral and liberal, and more concerned with international legitimacy."¹³ After the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, Posen argued, American strategy was, "unilateral, nationalistic, and oriented largely around the U.S. advantage in physical power, especially military power."¹⁴ Although the United States, under President Bush, applied a predominately unilateral approach to military engagements, it took a multilateral approach in many other avenues of political power. The key political decision for the United States, in terms of engagement decisions, waivers between the additional restraints of multilateral action versus the higher costs of acting alone.

¹¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (1979; repr., Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2010), 126.

¹² Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 27. Whereas direct coercion pertains to the use of force as a tool to convince others not to act, the carrot and stick method can be a softer approach which provides others with incentives to comply backed by force as a deterrent.

¹³ Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, 6.

¹⁴ Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, 6.

Unilateral policies of the past combined with uncontrolled spending have led to an erosion of United States hegemony. “Unipolarity and U.S. hegemony will likely be around for some time,” Posen argued, “though observers do suggest that the United States could hasten its own slide from the pinnacle through indiscipline or hyperactivity.”¹⁵ As its global hegemony continues to erode, American political leaders need to answer one major question: have the combined effects of two major wars, a loss of prestige, the fiscal crisis of 2008, and a rising challenger made American hegemony unsustainable over the long term?

China’s expansion into global markets and its potential to eliminate the status quo by creating a bipolar international system highlights a strategic crossroads for American political leaders. Chinese leaders have made it an objective of national policy to change the international structure, recognizing, “the progress toward economic globalization and a multi-polar world is irreversible. . .”¹⁶ As China rises, American leaders must determine if maintaining hegemony is in the long-term interests of the nation. If leaders perceive China’s rise as peaceful, the approach required may encompass Deborah Larson and Alexi Shevchenko’s logic that, “inclusion into higher-status groups may be a wiser strategy in the long run than containment, which may be counterproductive against a state that is primarily concerned with raising its international profile.”¹⁷ However, if the perceived value of hegemony is high enough, political leaders have three options. Each option brings about benefits and potential negative effects if executed. In the case of maintaining United States hegemony, China’s rise greatly influences the unlikely success of any of these three options.

First, a preventative war designed to maintain the international status quo and stunt China’s expansion is one course of action. Robert Gilpin postulated this option as a state’s “most attractive response” with the caveat that hegemonic powers maintain a small window where “by launching a preventative war the declining power destroys or

¹⁵ Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” *International Security* 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003): 5-46.

¹⁶ Information office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s National Defense in 2010,” 31 Mar 2011, 3, <http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/> node_7114675.htm (accessed 15 January 2013).

¹⁷ Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Status Concerns and Multilateral Cooperation,” in *International Cooperation: The Extents and Limits of Multilateralism*, ed. I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 192.

weakens the rising challenger while the military advantage is still with the declining power.”¹⁸ If China maintains its current trajectory in military spending, forecasters predict it could outpace United States defense spending by 2035.¹⁹ This window




Figure 1. Military spending forecast of China and the United States

Source: “*China’s Military Rise: The Dragons New Teeth; a Rare Look inside the World’s Largest Military Expansion*,” *The Economist*, 7 April 2011.

provides American leaders with a moderate period in which to prepare military forces for war. Although this option is possible, a violent conflict with China could result in significant losses in America’s military forces, civilian population, financial revenues, and international prestige.

The United States has not faced a near peer adversary since the Cold War. Additionally, outside of proxy wars, America has never entered a violent conflict against another nuclear powered nation. The idea of fighting a nuclear war with China is unfathomable as the level of destruction each state could inflict could foster widespread global instability and ultimately weaken both states. The most prudent use of force the United States could apply to stunt China’s rise is a limited war fought in the Pacific.

¹⁸ Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, 191.

¹⁹ “*China’s Military Rise: The Dragons New Teeth; a Rare Look Inside the World’s Largest Military Expansion*,” *The Economist*, 7 April 2011.

However, the risk of a limited war with China escalating to the use of nuclear weapons is quite high, if the political power in Beijing perceives its state and authority is sufficiently threatened.

A second option is for the United States to outpace China's economic growth rate. The major difficulty of this course of action stems from the United States' mature economy and its inability to expand rapidly. "Once a society reaches the limits of its expansion," Robert Gilpin noted, "it has great difficulty in maintaining its position . . . the diffusion of its economic, technological or organizational skills undercuts its comparative advantage over other societies . . ."²⁰ Since 2000, China's average annual gross domestic product growth rate has been 10.2 percent.²¹ Prior to the financial crisis in 2008, the United States could only muster an average annual growth rate of 2.6 percent from 2000-2007.²² The compounding of a major fiscal crisis and a mature social environment in the United States created an economic market that is not conducive to accelerated growth. Entitlement spending, which encompasses social programs such as welfare, social security, Medicare, and Medicaid, now accounts for almost 62 percent of total government spending and is forecast to reach 67 percent of government spending by 2022.²³ In 2012, the United States government spent \$29,691 compared to the \$20,293 it collected in taxes per household.²⁴ Additionally, the current total debt of \$16.4 trillion limits the ability for a high growth rate.²⁵ Although this enormous debt is not insurmountable, it provides a significant level of drag on the potential for economic growth.

A third option for maintaining the status quo is to slow China's growth rate. China's position as a rising state and its autocratic government structure afford it several

²⁰ Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, 185.

²¹ Gross Domestic Product Growth Rate of China and the United States extrapolated from World Bank database for 2000-2011, World Bank, <http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=3&id=4> (accessed 5 January 2013).

²² Gross Domestic Product Growth Rate of China and the United States extrapolated from World Bank database for years 2000-2007.

²³ Alison Acosta Fraser, "Federal Spending by the Numbers: 2012," The Heritage Foundation, 16 October 2012, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/10/federal-spending-by-the-numbers-2012>.

²⁴ Alison Acosta Fraser, "Federal Spending by the Numbers: 2012."

²⁵ Data extrapolated from United States Treasury Department, "The Debt to the Penny and Who Holds It," <http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/BPDLogin?application=np> (accessed 5 January 2013).

“advantages of backwardness.”²⁶ As a developing nation, it can take advantage of lower wages, less regulation, and the ability to copy technology from developed states. Lin Yifu, a professor at Peking University and former World Bank chief economist, theorized that with a few policy changes, China has the capability to grow annually at eight percent over the next 20 years.²⁷ A major portion of this growth stems from China’s ability to devalue its currency against the dollar. “Most economists,” according to Peter Navaro, “estimate the Chinese Yuan is grossly undervalued by anywhere from twenty-five to forty percent.”²⁸ Although the current administration acknowledged this fact, President Obama’s current policy to avoid labeling China as a currency manipulator demonstrates a potential lack of resolve for this option.²⁹

China’s current growth rate is fueled by its ability to trade low-end goods globally. If the United States were to attempt to slow China’s growth through trade restrictions, both countries would be weaker. The economic interdependence of the two states creates a major stumbling block for attempts at slowing China’s rise. Additionally, this option provides the potential for conflict to escalate to war if leaders in Beijing see this move as a threat to their national survival. During the 1940s, American leaders attempted to restrain Japan’s military and economic growth after its invasion of mainland China. The escalation of economic sanctions placed on Japan by the United States blocked the sales of aviation fuel, iron, and steel. By July of 1941, American leaders froze Japan’s assets and eliminated all trade with the Japanese. Although the economic sanctions were designed to deter Japanese aggression, four months later the United States was attacked at Pearl Harbor.³⁰ If the United States levies economic sanctions or other trade restrictions on China and the state is unable to find additional markets, attempts at slowing its growth could be a catalyst for violent conflict.

²⁶ Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, 185.

²⁷ Yi Xie, “China Growth Can Beat 8% for 20 years on Reform, Lin Says,” *Bloomberg*, 7 January 2013, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-07/china-growth-can-beat-8-for-20-years-on-reform-lin-says.html> (accessed 15 January 2013).

²⁸ Peter Navaro, “China’s Currency Manipulation: a Policy Debate,” *World Affairs*, September/October 2012, <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/china%20%80%99s-currency-manipulation-policy-debate> (accessed 20 January 2013).

²⁹ Anna Yukhananov, “U.S. Declines to Label China Currency Manipulator,” *Reuters*, 27 November 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/27/us-usa-china-treasury-idUSBRE8AQ19V20121127> (accessed 20 January 2013).

³⁰ David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 166.

The Cooperation Debate

“Mutual cooperation is often possible,” David Axelrod noted, “but not always achieved.”³¹ If maintaining global hegemony is not the primary political objective for the United States, a potential for increased cooperation with China exists. The key piece in developing a multilateral relationship between the United States, China, and a third party is finding common ground. If one ascribes to Kenneth Waltz’s theory that “international politics is a competitive realm,” a state will not enter into a cooperative effort unless it suits its self-interests. “States do not typically cooperate out of altruism or empathy with the plight of others,” Keohane noted, “nor for the sake of pursuing what they conceive as ‘international interests’. They seek wealth and security for their own people and search for power as a means to these ends,” he concluded.³² Although moral implications have played a significant role in United States involvement in East Africa, self-interests have been a driving factor in its foreign policy. The failures of past multilateral efforts to maintain regional stability are often a result of insufficient interests and competing goals.

Current fiscal constraints may require multilateral efforts to achieve United States’ diplomatic and economic objectives. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates explained in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, “the United States welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a greater global role . . .” and acknowledged “. . . the positive benefits that can accrue from greater cooperation.”³³ President Obama echoed this sentiment and the need for multilateral efforts: “our ability to advance constructive cooperation is essential to the security and prosperity of specific regions, and to facilitating global cooperation on issues ranging from violent extremism and nuclear proliferation, to climate change, and global economic instability—issues that challenge all nations, but that no one nation alone can meet.”³⁴ In an almost direct message to China, the President stated, “new and emerging powers who see greater voice and representation will need to accept greater responsibility for meeting global challenges.”³⁵

³¹ Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, Inc. Publishers, 1984), 110.

³² Keohane, *After Hegemony*, x.

³³ Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Report*, 60.

³⁴ President, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: Office of the President of the United States, May 2010), 11.

³⁵ President, *National Security Strategy*, 13.

If China is to become a major part of the international order, multilateral cooperation is a major requirement.

Methodology

The argument for great power cooperation, focused on increasing stability and development in East Africa, must answer two principle questions. First, under what conditions would a cooperative effort form between the United States and China? Second, do favorable conditions exist in the East African region to encourage and facilitate great power cooperation? In order to address these questions, this paper is divided into four main sections. The first chapter defines cooperation and discusses the incentives states and great powers gain from cooperative efforts. It then applies these ideas to create a cooperative framework for evaluating potential great power cooperation. The framework provided organizes the pressures placed on great power leaders into three spheres: domestic will, interstate relations, and international image.³⁶ The second chapter examines the historical background in East Africa, explains the root causes of regional instability, and highlights growing strategic interests in the region.

The latter half of the paper examines cooperation in East Africa. The third chapter is a case study on the failed attempt by the United States and France to provide stability in Rwanda. The purpose of this chapter is twofold. It helps establish validity for the cooperative framework presented in Chapter One and it explains how two states with similar ideologies failed to prevent events from escalating beyond a level of conflict management. This chapter highlights the idea that effective cooperation in conflict management is heavily dependent on the alignment of interests and policy. The fourth chapter utilizes the cooperative framework to analyze the potential for the United States and China to form great power cooperation in East Africa. The conclusion of the paper provides an overall summary of the findings and recommendations for policy makers, if they chose to pursue such an effort. Although cooperation is not the answer to every international problem, the exercise of negotiating and enacting confidence-building measures, based on great power cooperation, can help political leaders on both sides increase international stability.

³⁶ The term *interstate* describes the relationship between the core states involved in a cooperative effort.

Chapter 1

Great Power Cooperation

States are not politically or economically autarkic; they are not alone. They need the active or passive help of others in order to achieve their goals.

William Zartman and Saadia Touval, *International Cooperation*, 2010

Great powers can no longer seek isolation as a foreign policy. Globalization, which Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye defined as, “a state of the world involving networks of interdependence at multi-continental distances,” is continuing to mature.¹ It has created greater incentives for nations to seek common ground and cooperate through economic, diplomatic, and security interactions. In the past, great powers dominated global interactions due to their power to overcome geographic and diplomatic barriers. Although great powers still maintain significant influence in the international system, advances in logistics, communications, and scarcity of resources have increased the interaction among states.

As state interdependence has increased, areas for both competition and cooperation have also risen. “Cooperation,” Keohane stated, “should not be viewed as the absence of conflict, but rather as a reaction to conflict or potential conflict.”² Although Keohane emphasized that political leaders have a choice in the matter, anarchy in the international structure has a significant role in shaping the outcome of conflict or cooperation in international relations.³ Weaker states may perceive institutions or great powers as exerting authority over them; however the anarchy inherent in the international system relegates great powers to resolve their differences through cooperation or war. When great powers increase peacetime interactions on a global scale, opportunities for transparency and greater understanding of each other’s intentions can reduce the potential

¹ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Between Centralization and Fragmentation: The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy” (Paper prepared for the American Political Science Convention, Washington, D.C., August 2000), 1, <http://web.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=4> (accessed 20 January 2013).

² Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (1984; repr., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 54.

³ Benjamin Miller, *When Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conflict and Collaboration in World Politics* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1995), 3.

for violent conflict. If great powers are to fulfill their role of maintaining international order and stability, they must recognize when their interests are in discord and pursue conflict resolution efforts. Furthermore, great powers must also realize areas where their interests intersect. A cooperative effort could benefit the greater good of the international community while at the same time advancing the self-interests of great powers involved.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the nuances of great power cooperation and suggest a framework to evaluate potential areas for great power cooperation and conflict resolution. In order to develop this framework, it is important to define cooperation and identify the incentives that exist in international relations. The first section of this chapter defines cooperation at the state level and explains how it differs from harmony and discord. The second section explains why states pursue cooperation and the benefits of such a political action. The third section of the chapter defines a great power and explains two unique characteristics of great power cooperation. The final section presents a theoretical framework based on domestic, interstate, and international spheres to analyze potential areas for great power cooperation and conflict resolution.

Harmony, Discord, and Defining Cooperation

In order to define cooperation, the term must be distinguished from harmony and discord in the international environment. Robert Keohane defined harmony as, “a situation in which an actor’s policies (pursued in their own self-interests without regard for others) *automatically* facilitate the attainment of others’ goals.”⁴ Harmony is not something that states can intentionally pursue, but something that occurs by happenstance. Emanuel Kant theorized that after years of war and strife, an enduring society would emerge where states would live in harmony with one another.⁵ This utopian view, solidified in idealism, places a high confidence in the positive nature of man and his ability to pursue interests in concurrence with others. Although some leaders may ascribe to this Kantian view and espouse international harmony as a global goal, harmony is an unintentional phenomenon confined to unique circumstances. A more pessimistic view of man as an individual focused on self-interests may go further to

⁴ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 51.

⁵ Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), 254.

explain why state interactions tend to gravitate initially towards discord instead of harmony. The distinction between these two terms is critical because on the rare occasion where harmony exists, states need not pursue a cooperative effort.⁶

Discord is a foundational element of international relations. The antithesis of harmony, discord is “a situation in which governments regard each other’s policies as hindering the attainment of their goals, and hold each other responsible for these constraints.”⁷ The development of discord is thus not a negative characteristic, so long as it doesn’t escalate to violence, but is a byproduct of increased state interaction. “Globalism and the networks of interdependence that it reflects,” according to Keohane and Nye, “create the potential for discord, since the desired actions of governments often adversely affect their neighbors.”⁸ Once a state encounters discord, its political leaders face two key decision points. First, they must decide if the benefits of cooperation are important enough to consider potential changes in policy. If they are willing to modify their policies, they come to a second decision point. Political leaders must decide if they can find common ground with another state to further their interests at the expense of policy revision.⁹ If political leaders are either unwilling to change their policy or unable to negotiate a change, discord remains.

Therefore, cooperation, which is more prevalent in the international environment than harmony, ultimately finds its roots in discord. The main point of this observation is that state leaders decide if it is in their best interest to continue in discord or develop a cooperative relationship with another state. “Cooperation,” according to Keohane, “is viewed by policymakers less as an end in itself than a means to a variety of other objectives.”¹⁰ Cooperation, as he defined it, is an action that “occurs when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination.”¹¹ When examining the characteristics of a cooperative effort, however, it is important to distinguish it from a coercive action. Coercion, according to Thomas Schelling, “requires finding a bargain, arranging for him to be better off doing

⁶ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 52.

⁷ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 52.

⁸ Keohane and Nye, “Between Centralization and Fragmentation,” 1.

⁹ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 53.

¹⁰ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 10.

¹¹ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 51.

what we want—worse off not doing what we want—when he takes the threatened penalty into account.”¹² Although the end result of a cooperative or coercive policy may be the same, the key difference is in the means used to coordinate the policy change. Zartman and Touval further codified this characterization of cooperation as “buying agreement with agreement, including compensations, rather than forcing it with punishments, using carrots or warmth rather than sticks or bluster.”¹³ For cooperation to work, diplomatic leaders must identify areas of discord where combined gains will exceed the benefit of unilateral action and the transaction costs of cooperation.¹⁴ Before analyzing the question “why great powers cooperate,” it is important to examine the incentives for cooperation at a basic state level.

What Incentives Exist for States to Cooperate?

Although altruism may be a secondary motivation, states seek cooperation during non-crisis moments to advance their self-interests. Each governmental body makes its decision to participate in a cooperative effort based on a rather complex cost-benefit analysis of unilateral versus multilateral action. The costs of cooperative efforts primarily reside in the form of restrictions on a state’s objectives, larger bureaucratic budgets for coordination of staffing and communications, and delays in the decision making process. Depending on the asymmetry of power in the relationship, some states may carry a larger share of these costs. “In small groups with common interests,” Mancur Olson noted, “there is accordingly a surprising tendency for the ‘exploitation’ of the great by the small.”¹⁵ This perceived relative-gains problem, wherein a weaker state, and potential future adversary, could gain more from the cooperative effort, is a barrier to cooperation.¹⁶

¹² Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (1966; repr., New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2008), 4.

¹³ I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, ed., *International Cooperation: The Extents and Limits of Multilateralism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 165.

¹⁴ Zartman and Touval, *International Cooperation*, 1.

¹⁵ Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (1965; repr., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 35.

¹⁶ Joseph M. Grieco, *Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), 10.

Although many states prefer to maximize their freedom of action for this reason, unilateral action can hamper their pursuit of self-interests.¹⁷ As globalization expands and states become more interconnected, the benefits of cooperation and costs of unilateral action will continue to rise. If the perceived benefits of a cooperative effort exceed the potential costs or risks of an agreement, states can use cooperation as a means to achieve their long-term interests. When conducting a cost-benefit analysis of a cooperative effort, state leaders should recognize and evaluate the benefits based on four primary incentives.¹⁸

First, cooperative agreements provide state leaders with the ability to lower their financial burdens and share risks in an uncertain international environment. “States cooperate,” according to Zartman and Touval, “when they can achieve gains through pooling efforts and through trade, and economic concepts that has equal meaning in politics and that encapsulates the basic notion of negotiation.”¹⁹ Few states have the economic power to pursue major international objectives unilaterally over the long-term. In a fiscally constrained environment, cooperation becomes even more critical as it can enable states to achieve mutual interests with reduced economic expenditures. A notable example of this is the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949. The battle against Nazi Germany during World War II destroyed the economic and military power of European states, leaving them vulnerable to a potential Soviet invasion. Through a common interest to deter Soviet expansionism, prevent nationalist militarism, and further develop European integration, weaker European states combined their military and economic resources with the United States.²⁰ This multilateral cooperation lowered the overall costs of independent action. Even though the United States bore the major financial burden, the benefits of a stable and secure Western Europe exceeded the costs it would have incurred to extract the Soviet Union had it occupied the region.

The ability to hedge against the economic risks of an uncertain global future is another financial benefit of cooperative action. States are pulled in so many directions as they attempt to pursue economic, political, and security interests that cooperation in

¹⁷ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 259.

¹⁸ Zartman and Touval, *International Cooperation*, 9.

¹⁹ Zartman and Touval, *International Cooperation*, 228.

²⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “A Short History of NATO,” <http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html>.

select areas is almost a requirement. States cannot afford to finance every priority that exists in their national strategy. As Zartman and Touval noted, “. . . elusive ends, scarce means, reducible costs—drive parties to work together over a short or longer time, depending in turn on their estimates of the other parties' proclivities to do the same thing.”²¹ Cooperation enables states to balance the risks of financial investments collectively in their pursuit of self-interests.

A second reason state leaders seek cooperation is when the benefits of gaining international legitimacy exceed the costs of changing state policy. Legitimacy, as defined by Ian Hurd, is the “normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed.”²² Although his definition provides insight into reasons for normalized state behavior, legitimacy also enables states to gain support for their actions. “Legitimacy,” as David Hendrickson and Robert Tucker observed, “arises from the conviction that state action proceeds within the ambit of law, in two senses: first, that action issues from rightful authority . . . and second, that it does not violate a legal or moral norm.”²³ A state’s ability to establish legitimacy in the international environment does not necessarily signify its action as correct but merely validates its actions as permitted by other state actors. “Ultimately,” Hendrickson and Tucker continued, “. . . legitimacy is rooted in opinion, and thus actions that are unlawful in either of these senses may, in principle, still be deemed legitimate.”²⁴

This concept is significant because states, which all seek to advance their individual interests, can coalesce to create an acceptable behavior. Furthering this logic, the more states, institutions, and organizations involved in a cooperative effort, the greater the legitimacy of their actions. While this may be true, the one caveat is that the actual political power of the states is just as, if not more important than, the actual number of states involved. In preparation for the 2003 Iraq war, the United States attempted to receive United Nations support for an invasion of Iraq and subsequent overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime. When the United Nations would not authorize

²¹ Zartman and Touval, *International Cooperation*, 5.

²² Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” *International Organization*, 53, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 379–408.

²³ David C. Hendrickson and Robert W. Tucker, “The Sources of American Legitimacy,” *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2004, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/60262/robert-w-tucker-and-david-c-hendrickson/the-sources-of-american-legitimacy> (accessed 5 March 2013).

²⁴ Hendrickson and Tucker, “The Sources of American Legitimacy.”

the use of force in Iraq, the United States established a multilateral coalition of the willing in order to boost legitimacy for its actions. Although this was a multilateral effort, critics argued that based on the preponderance of United States contributions and control of the operations, it was really a unilateral action by the United States. From 2003 to 2011 the United States spent \$801.9 billion, dwarfing its next closest ally, the United Kingdom, which spent roughly \$14.3 billion.²⁵ Although the coalition of the willing included thirty nations, the disparity in multilateral commitment combined with the lack of political power of these smaller states resulted in what could be argued a legal yet illegitimate war.

A state's involvement in unilateral or multilateral efforts has the potential to affect future international relations. Sacrificing complete fulfillment of policy objectives to sustain international opinion as a legitimate actor may be in a state's best interests. If a state has a proclivity towards cooperation, demonstrated through past actions and patterns of behavior, its established legitimacy can help convince other states to cooperate with it on future efforts. The major problem with acting alone is that "most states cannot adopt such a position or strategy because they cannot withstand the pressure from the international community to conform."²⁶ Even if states are able to, acting alone can potentially damage a state's legitimacy. The questionable legality of entering a war with Iraq, combined with its perception as a unilateral action eroded the overall legitimacy of United States power.²⁷ Since then, the United States has struggled to conform to international norms in order to regain the legitimacy it held in the 1990s.

The third benefit of international cooperation is that it can help establish standards of behavior to which states adhere and expect each other to follow. Prior to commencing a multilateral cooperation, states must negotiate their policies to create a set of norms and principles which confine the limits within which each will act.²⁸ The agreed-upon constraints form the basis for an international regime. "Regimes," as defined by Joseph Grieco, "are the norms, principles, rules, and decision-making procedures that shape,

²⁵ British Broadcasting Channel, "Iraq War in Figures," 14 December 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11107739> (accessed 5 March 2013).

²⁶ Charles Doran, "The Two Sides of Multilateral Cooperation," in *International Cooperation*, ed. Zartman and Touval, 52.

²⁷ Hendrickson and Tucker, "The Sources of American Legitimacy."

²⁸ Zartman and Touval, *International Cooperation*, 9.

guide, and constrain state policies in such a way as to promote common or compatible ends in a particular area.”²⁹ In order to understand the basis for such a regime, it is important to define the terms above. Robert Keohane defined norms as “standards of behavior” and principles as “the purposes that their members are expected to pursue.” Rules, which indicate the rights and obligations of states involved in the regime, he stated, “can be altered more easily than principles or norms, since there may be more than one set of rules that can attain a given set of purposes.” Further expanding upon this concept, Keohane stated, “decision-making procedures of regimes provide ways of implementing their principles and altering their rules.”³⁰

Regimes help provide stability in international relations. The establishment of common norms, rules, and principles can assist states in their long-term objectives by clarifying the expectations of the international relationship. Cooperative efforts among asymmetrically-powered states can potentially assist each in pursuing its objectives. For stronger states, a solidified agreement of norms and principles influences weaker states to comply. In return for this action, weaker states receive assurance that a stronger state will remain in compliance with the agreement should it lose its current power.³¹ The commitment states make provide each with the ability to make more sound decisions based on mutual expectations. “Even powerful states,” Keohane noted, “have an interest, most of the time, in following the rules of well-established international institutions, since general conformity to rules makes the behavior of other states more predictable.”³²

The dilemma then for effective cooperation hinges on the ability to confirm that states are not violating the rules of the regime. Cooperation can be inhibited due to the fear that another state will gain an advantage through violating established norms.³³ Although it is unlikely that all violations can be eliminated from a cooperative effort, the interconnectedness of the global environment and movement into the information age increase the chances that cheaters will be caught. If caught, a state’s ability to establish future long-term relationships based on reciprocity may be in jeopardy. As Keohane

²⁹ Grieco, *Cooperation Among Nations*, 22.

³⁰ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 57, 58.

³¹ Zartman and Touval, *International Cooperation*, 9.

³² Robert O. Keohane, *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 30.

³³ Grieco, *Cooperation Among Nations*, 10.

pointed out, “a reputation as an unreliable partner may prevent a government from being able to make beneficial agreements in the future.”³⁴ Furthermore, the increasing involvement of states in international institutions can help prevent violations while increasing the role of transparency in international relations.³⁵

The fourth main incentive for state cooperation is the opportunity to increase the transparency of each member’s intentions. One of the significant obstacles in international relations is that another political leader’s intentions are difficult to extract, relegating many decisions to be based, right or wrong, on an interpretation of their physical capabilities. Unfortunately, the message one state attempts to convey is easily misinterpreted if the receiver lacks an understanding of the senders background.³⁶ One method to improve the understanding of states is an increase in interaction through cooperative engagements. Although a cooperative effort will not resolve all misperceived intentions, it affords the opportunity to establish communication and develop further understanding of one’s intentions. As long-term agreements grow, the ability to see through the uncertainty of another state’s intentions tends to increase as a level of mutual understanding develops. Additionally, Keohane noted that institutions further assist in this process by “dealing with a series of issues over many years and under similar rules, thus encouraging honesty in order to preserve future reputation; and by systematically monitoring the compliance of governments with their commitments.”³⁷

What Incentives Exist for Great Powers to Cooperate?

Great power cooperation, while acknowledging the previous four incentives, predominately focuses on two additional incentives: the conservation of power and the protection of global stability and order. Hedley Bull presented three criteria required to define a great power: first in the international environment there must be “two or more powers that are comparable in status,” second, a state must be “in the front rank in terms of military strength,” and third, states must “assert the right, and are accorded the right, to play a part in determining issues that affect the peace and security of the international

³⁴ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 258.

³⁵ Grieco, *Cooperation Among Nations*, 35.

³⁶ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 205.

³⁷ Keohane, *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World*, 30.

system as a whole.”³⁸ In a more liberal interpretation, Barry Buzon and Ole Waever do not focus on the need to categorize a great power as a state with “big capabilities in all sectors,” but one which is “responded to by others on the basis of system level calculations about the present and near-future distribution of power.” In their description, Britain, France, Germany, the European Union, Japan, China and Russia currently hold great power status.³⁹

Although many of the states Buzon and Waever identify as great powers have a significant amount of power, Bull’s argument for a strong military and significant role in determining the “security of the international system” provides a better definition of a great power. Currently there are only three states meeting Bull’s criteria for great power status: the United States, China, and Russia. Although the United States presently dwarfs China and Russia’s military capability, these two states maintain the world’s next two largest forces, and all three hold a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. The responsibility that comes with such a position of power, combined with the political will to shape international order, contribute to the elevated importance of distinguishing great power cooperation from that of a normal multilateral effort.

Although increases in state interactions drive an increase in the number of areas for discord, it also enables states to conserve resources and power while pursuing their own self-interests. The globalization of financial markets and increases in great power interdependence has driven political leaders to consider cooperative efforts that were unfathomable in the past. Although a hegemonic power may prefer to act alone, “it does not have the means to act unilaterally everywhere every time, but only when success is likely and benefits outweigh costs. . . .”⁴⁰ Great powers should recognize globalization as an “economic, military, environmental, and social” process that “thickens” interdependent linkages among these networks.⁴¹ In so doing, if a state is to maintain its power, it must seek areas that are conducive to cooperation. As great powers develop, the cost of acting alone rises. “Military strength tends to erode; economic efficiency gives

³⁸ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 3d ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 194-196.

³⁹ Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 35, 36.

⁴⁰ Zartman, *International Cooperation*, 164.

⁴¹ Keohane and Nye, “Between Centralization and Fragmentation,” 1.

way to various diseconomies and a slackening in economic growth;” Gilpin concluded, and “the military and economic competitiveness of the society declines.”⁴² The continuous use of a leading state’s power to resolve conflict as it pursues its own interests is not only economically expensive but potentially detrimental to its long-term objectives.⁴³

Cooperation among great powers can also help shape the international environment and assist in the prevention of major violent conflict. Hedley Bull introduced three ways great powers manage their interests with each other to preserve international order: “(i) preserving the general balance of power, (ii) seeking to avoid or control crises in their relations with one another, and (iii) seeking to limit or contain wars among one another.”⁴⁴ Although he insisted cooperation or a “great power concert” was not required to achieve these measures, cooperation can assist in the avoidance of violent conflict. As previously mentioned, cooperative interactions help increase transparency and reveal state intentions.

A Suggestive Framework for Great Power Cooperation

The complexities of internal and external relationships present a major challenge to developing a predictive model for great power cooperation in conflict management. Benjamin Miller presented a model that examined cooperation in crisis management and conflict resolution as both an intended and unintended outcome.⁴⁵ Although both international structure and domestic will play a role in a political leader’s decision to cooperate or remain in conflict with another state, the two factors vary in significance depending on the situation. “Although systemic factors have a predominant influence on decision makers’ behavior in times of crisis,” Miller theorized, “the basic cognitive elements that underlie their decision making come to the fore during periods of

⁴² Robert Gilpin, *War & Change in World Politics* (1981; repr., New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 159.

⁴³ G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 53.

⁴⁴ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 200.

⁴⁵ Miller, *When Opponents Cooperate*, 2.

noncrisis.”⁴⁶ His incorporation of balance-of-power theory with that of unit-level theory provides the foundation for understanding cooperation during conflict resolution.

A one-size-fits-all theory of international cooperation is of little value. Each state interaction is unique and a theory must examine the context of the region, time period, individual state’s interests and the interdependence of international relationships.⁴⁷

Strategic interaction, according to Allison Stanger, “. . . must be wedded to a rich understanding of the context in which that engagement takes place if we are to know when and under what circumstances cooperation is most likely to carry the day.”⁴⁸ The major challenge in this endeavor is uncovering how a state prioritizes domestic, interstate, and international factors when deciding upon a course of cooperative or unilateral action.⁴⁹ The framework below is based on three spheres which influence political leaders. It is not a predictive model for cooperation but merely a suggestive tool to analyze the potential for a successful cooperative effort.

The three spheres include the domestic pressure of a state’s interests and policy, the pressure of interstate relationships based on a history of reciprocity and predicted longevity, and the pressure of the international community as a value of perceived prestige and legitimacy. The concept presented below, which incorporates three spheres in international relations, is an attempt to reduce several complex factors and dynamic relationships into a simple framework to analyze the potential for cooperation on a given issue.

Domestic Sphere

Of the three spheres that affect cooperation, domestic will provides the greatest influence on conflict resolution among great powers. Miller recognized the difference between crisis and conflict resolution in the fact that “normal bargaining is, by contrast, less intensive and dramatic and thereby more likely to be influenced by bureaucratic politics and cognitive biases.”⁵⁰ When time is not a factor, states can afford to prolong

⁴⁶ Miller, *When Opponents Cooperate*, 41.

⁴⁷ Allison Stanger, “The Shadow of the Past over Conflict and Cooperation,” in *International Cooperation*, 133.

⁴⁸ Stanger, “The Shadow of the Past over Conflict and Cooperation,” in *International Cooperation*, 112.

⁴⁹ The term interstate is used throughout this paper to describe the relationship of the core states involved in a cooperative effort.

⁵⁰ Benjamin Miller, “Explaining Great Power Cooperation in Conflict Management,” *World Politics* 45, no. 1 (October 1992): 29.

negotiations in order to achieve a more advantageous agreement or dissolve the discussion if their interests are not met. Although domestic will is influenced by many actors, it can be simplified to the dominant interests of a state and the policy a state follows to achieve its interests. These two aspects of domestic will are significant factors affecting the decision making process of cooperation.

Converging self-interests play a primary role in persuading states to proceed in cooperative efforts outside of a crisis.⁵¹ This is the most critical link to cooperation during conflict management as great powers have numerous avenues and capabilities to pursue their objectives. When the pressure of a time-critical decision is removed, a state's leaders have the ability to debate the options and delay cooperative agreements. During non-crisis periods, states have time to focus on a variety of interests ranging from "economic prosperity, social welfare, diplomatic prestige, and ideological imperatives."⁵² Additionally, the proclivity states have for individual interests vary in importance as the international environment changes. Great powers are primarily concerned with three interests: gaining or maintaining power, sustaining international order through the management of great power interactions, and directing the "affairs of international society as a whole."⁵³ This leads to my first great-power cooperation hypothesis: if enough interests intersect between great powers without reducing their individual ability to sustain their power or position in the international order, the potential exists for cooperation to emerge.

Additionally, when a close connection to a state's national security is not involved, the potential for cooperation increases. Realism, according to Joseph Greico, "argues that individual well-being is not the key interest of states; instead it finds that survival and independence constitute their core interest."⁵⁴ If a state perceives that a cooperative effort could threaten its power negotiations will ultimately fail. The power that sustains a state is best characterized in terms of military, economic, and technological capabilities.⁵⁵ Although small and great powers alike will continue to

⁵¹ Miller, *When Opponents Cooperate*, 54.

⁵² Miller, "Explaining Great Power Cooperation in Conflict Management," 1-46, 28 and Miller, *When Opponents Cooperate*, 29.

⁵³ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 200.

⁵⁴ Greico, *Cooperation Among Nations*, 39.

⁵⁵ Gilpin, *War & Change in World Politics*, 13.

compete for advantage in each of these areas, the potential for cooperation exists. Outside of crisis management, cooperation is more likely to occur if states perceive mutual benefit from their actions on an equal level. Miller theorized that certain states may desire a zero-sum view “because states are worried that cooperation for mutual gains may favor present partners, who may become potential opponents in the future; they are more concerned about relative gains than about absolute ones.”⁵⁶ Although this may be true in certain areas, the interdependence of states makes the majority of issues less centered on a zero-sum approach.⁵⁷ This leads to a second great-power cooperation hypothesis: when mutual gains are seen by both great powers as having a neutral or zero effect on their security, the potential for a cooperative effort increases.

A cooperative effort is more likely to occur among great powers if the area of action is outside of both states’ perceived spheres of influence. Hedley Bull observed the need to “distinguish an agreement or understanding between two powers to recognize the fact of one another’s preponderance in some area, from an agreement to recognize each other’s rights in that area.”⁵⁸ Although one great power may maintain a greater presence in a geographic area, if it views another’s actions as trampling on its perceived rights in a sphere of influence, cooperation is unlikely to occur. Therefore, the critical point to understand in a potential cooperative area is how each state perceives its rights. These rights may have been previously granted by other great powers or self-proclaimed. This leads to a third great-power cooperation hypothesis: great power cooperation is easier to establish if the interests of states coincide outside of their perceived spheres of influence.

Although the interests of the states involved may be similar, political ideologies must be considered as a potential barrier to cooperation. In order to predict potential areas for cooperation, leaders must understand the differences in state ideologies. Differing styles of politics have a significant impact on the ability of states to communicate their interests in order to find common ground. However, commonalities in political structures, such as a liberal democracy, do not guarantee cooperation. Leaders seeking a cooperative effort are most concerned with how states pursue self-interests and perceive multilateral interaction. Although areas of convergent interests often exist, the pursuit of those

⁵⁶ Miller, “Explaining Great Power Cooperation in Conflict Management,” 27.

⁵⁷ Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, Inc. Publishers, 1984), 110.

⁵⁸ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 212.

interests varies drastically among differing state policies. The ability to cooperate may hinge on a state's policy flexibility and how accepting they are of different views. If, "ideological polarization is somewhat weakened or at least decision makers' perceptions of key international issues converge," Miller argued, there will be, ". . . a greater willingness to cooperate in settling disputes."⁵⁹ Cooperative areas, which were non-existent in the past, may need to be reexamined. Many ideological rivalries end after a political leader dies or is removed from office.⁶⁰ Changes in the international environment attributed to globalization and shifts in domestic structure have the potential to facilitate policy change and great power cooperation.

Although the degree of divergence in a state's overall policy does not eliminate the potential for a cooperative effort, there must be a convergence of policy around the specific action for cooperation to exist. The ability for states to minimize disputes, and sustain areas of common belief, is critical to cooperation under the realm of conflict resolution.⁶¹

Interstate Sphere

An examination of self-interests and policies cannot be separated from an examination of how states interact to form a cooperative effort. Robert Axelrod's experiments with the Prisoner's Dilemma game during the early 1980s provide a background to characterize the interstate sphere of influence. By reducing the complexity of international cooperation to a simple model of individual interaction, Robert Axelrod laid the foundation for a cooperative theory of states. Using game theory, he tested the Prisoner's Dilemma against numerous different strategies put forth by his test subjects. The basic premise of the Prisoner's Dilemma is that two opponents, who are unable to communicate, must choose between cooperating with the other to maintain their innocence or defecting from their opponent in order to improve their own position. In Axelrod's approach, he awarded three points to each opponent if they cooperated and one point to each if they both defected. However, if one defected and the other cooperated, the former received five points while the latter received zero (see Figure 2). Throughout

⁵⁹ Miller, *When Opponents Cooperate*, 40.

⁶⁰ David R. Dreyer, "Issue Intractability and the Persistence of International Rivalry," *Conflict Management and Peace Science: Journal of the Peace Science Society (International)* 29, no. 5 (November, 2012): 486.

⁶¹ Miller, "Explaining Great Power Cooperation in Conflict Management," 17.

the process, Axelrod maintained an anarchical structure, simulating the international environment, where players worked towards their own self-interest without a central authority to promote or enforce cooperation.⁶²




Figure 2. Prisoner's dilemma scorecard

Source: *Prisoner's dilemma file at www.xray-delta.com*

The ultimate observation from these experiments was that, “under suitable conditions, cooperation can indeed emerge in a world of egoists without central authority.”⁶³ After scoring numerous different strategies, Axelrod found the most successful was a Tit-for-Tat policy. When the two players chose to cooperate on the first move and then repeated the previous move of the opponent, cooperation or defection, each individual achieved the maximum score for their specific situation. Additionally, as individuals interacted and cooperated more, their value of cooperation increased as each began to care more for the welfare of the other.⁶⁴

From Axelrod’s Prisoner’s Dilemma experiment, one can glean two main themes for successful cooperation. The first is that states must understand each other’s history of

⁶² Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, 6, 8.

⁶³ Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, 20.

⁶⁴ Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, 13, 85.

decisions and interstate relations. Although history is not a predictor of future behavior, it provides a starting point when calculating how to proceed in negotiations. “Knowing people's reputations,” Axelrod stated, “allows you to know something about what strategy they use even before you have to make your first choice.”⁶⁵ According to his observations, the first move is critical as it sets the precedent for cooperation or conflict. After a move is executed, either for cooperation or default, it is in the best interests of each individual to reproduce the move first put forward by an opponent. He expanded upon this concept in his comment that “the choices made today not only determine the outcome of this move, but can also influence the later choices of the players.”⁶⁶ The one major problem with this theory is that it does not explain why a state with a history of defection would change its strategy towards cooperation. Axelrod answered this question with the idea that cooperation can evolve from a small cluster of individuals who are willing to reciprocate cooperative efforts.⁶⁷ Once cooperation is introduced into an area of discord, reciprocity can persuade non-cooperative states that it is in their best interest to comply. Axelrod completed this theory with the idea that “cooperation, once established on the basis of reciprocity, can protect itself from invasion by less cooperative strategies.”⁶⁸

The second main observation from his experiment is that cooperation is most likely to occur when individuals anticipate a long-term relationship. “When the interaction is likely to continue for a long time, and the players care enough about their future together,” Axelrod noted, “the conditions are ripe for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation.”⁶⁹ Although a player who defects may gain a slight advantage over another, the action is short-sighted and prevents the opportunity for mutual benefits over time. The highest scorers in Axelrod’s evaluation resulted from those who held a positive-sum approach and were committed to long-term cooperation.⁷⁰ If state leaders perceive they will sustain long-term interactions with another state, cooperation in specific areas may be in their best interests. From these observations, the

⁶⁵ Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, 151.

⁶⁶ Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, 12.

⁶⁷ Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, 21, 120.

⁶⁸ Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, 21.

⁶⁹ Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, 182.

⁷⁰ Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, 33.

two criteria presented in the interstate sphere that tend to lead to cooperative reciprocity are relationship longevity and a history of cooperation.

International Sphere

The third sphere political leaders must evaluate to assess the feasibility of a cooperative effort is the perception of how states outside of the cooperating core will view their actions.⁷¹ This characteristic of this sphere is best categorized in terms of international prestige and legitimacy. Although domestic will remains the most significant factor in cooperation during conflict resolution, prestige and legitimacy are important when considering great power cooperation.

The perceptions of other nations and international institutions have a significant impact on state policy. The ability to gain prestige from a cooperative effort is dependent on the perception of an individual state. Prestige, as defined by Robert Gilpin, is “the perceptions of other states with respect to a state’s capacities and its ability and willingness to exercise its power.”⁷² It is extremely hard for a state to measure how other states view its power however; prestige is a crucial factor in promoting future interactions with other states. As states increase their interactions with great powers, a sense of prestige-by-association can develop in how great and lesser states view each nation. When determining the potential for a cooperative effort, the value of prestige should be viewed in the same manner as earlier discussions on zero-sum versus positive-sum gains. Although the main focus of this paper is conflict resolution, similarities exist between the pressures of violent and non-violent conflict.

Relative gains in prestige can exert pressure on leaders when making the decision to cooperate. Thomas Schelling recognized this concept in his adaptation of the “game of chicken” to crisis management. “Face,” he stated, “is merely the interdependence of a country’s commitments; it is a country’s reputation for action, the expectations other countries have about its behavior.”⁷³ There is a distinction between the reputation of toughness required to deter adversaries against violent conflict and that of the reliability to keep a cooperative agreement. Schelling’s observations apply to conflict resolution as

⁷¹ Zartman and Touval, *International Cooperation*, 8.

⁷² Gilpin, *War & Change in World Politics*, 31.

⁷³ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 124.

well.⁷⁴ The need to cooperate in a current area of conflict may not be as significant as the message it sends for how other states will view their future moves.⁷⁵ For cooperation to develop, both states must perceive a gain in prestige or at least zero loss. If the stronger state perceives the interaction as a relative-gains problem, wherein the weaker power could gain more prestige, the cooperation is unlikely to succeed. Certain cooperative actions, though agreed to with good intentions, may result in strained relations in other areas of self-interest.

The second main area for evaluating the international reaction to a cooperative effort is the effect it has on the legitimacy of each state. Legitimacy, as Henry Kissinger referred to it, “implies the acceptance of the framework of the international order by all major powers, at least to the extent that no state is so dissatisfied that . . . it expresses its dissatisfaction in a revolutionary foreign policy.”⁷⁶ Although this definition is too narrow for analyzing a cooperative effort, it provides the basic framework for a working definition of legitimacy. Legitimacy is best described as the ability for a state to pursue its interests in a manner that is acceptable to the overall international community. In its simplest form, as previously defined, “. . . legitimacy is rooted in opinion. . . .”⁷⁷

A cooperative effort is more likely to succeed if it is deemed legitimate by the states directly and indirectly affected by the agreement. Political leaders on both sides should analyze the impact a potential action will have on the regional and global environment. Outcries from the international community may not only delay a cooperative agreement but also derail the entire process. As Zartman and Touval astutely theorized, “it is in the interest of the cooperators not to arouse conflict with those left out. . . .”⁷⁸ If the observable interests of the cooperating core align with those of the international community, there will be less objection to and potential support for the multilateral cooperation. When a state’s actions are deemed as legitimate by regional and international actors, the ability to pursue self-interests in other areas expands. Although it is hard to measure, legitimacy is another factor political leaders consider in choosing

⁷⁴ Joe Clare and Vesna Danilovic, “Reputation for Resolve, Interests, and Conflict,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science: Journal of the Peace Science Society (International)* 29, no. 1 (February 2012): 6.

⁷⁵ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 118.

⁷⁶ Quoted in Gilpin, *War & Change in World Politics*, 12.

⁷⁷ Hendrickson and Tucker, “The Sources of American Legitimacy.”

⁷⁸ Zartman and Touval, *International Cooperation*, 8.

what interests are important and with whom they should cooperate to achieve their interests. Great power cooperation is dependent on a “network of mutual interactions” and the ability to withstand international pressure through beneficial ties, not only between the states involved but those outside the cooperative effort.⁷⁹ When assessing the potential for a successful cooperative effort, neither international prestige nor legitimacy can be left out of the analysis.

Conclusion

The ability for political leaders to pursue areas for great power cooperation rests on a contextual understanding of the complex international and domestic environments. Although areas of harmony may exist, the majority of international relations involve some level both of discord and cooperation. State leaders should recognize that not all discord is negative as they work to defuse areas of conflict. Although cooperation is not conducive to solving every area of discord, there are incentives which provide significant benefits for states to cooperate instead of seeking unilateral actions. The four main incentives of cooperation are: to reduce overall cost, increase legitimacy for actions, to establish norms and standards of behavior for future interactions, and to gain transparency through interstate relations.

Although great powers have the same incentives to cooperate, the nature of their power and stature in world order create two extra incentives. Great powers are predominantly concerned with sustaining their power along with providing direction to the international order. Great power cooperation provides states with the ability to conserve power in their pursuit of common interests and maintain international order by reducing the potential for violent conflict.

This chapter synthesized these concepts into a suggestive model that categorizes the factors which influence cooperative efforts. The spheres of domestic will, interstate relationships, and international opinion exert pressure on political leaders. In terms of domestic will, both the political structure of states and its policy are important factors for examination. The critical factors for examination of interstate relationships are the historical relations of states in regards to reciprocity and potential longevity of future

⁷⁹ Keohane, *Power and Governance*, 54.

interactions. Under the international sphere, the compatibility of a cooperative effort must be evaluated for the potential prestige and legitimacy that each state will receive from such actions. The purpose of this theoretical framework is to help leaders identify the areas where interests meet and acknowledge barriers to cooperation from which they can work to resolve discord. Although these three spheres are important, the value each individual state assigns to a sphere varies based upon current domestic factors and self-interest.

The purpose of this chapter was to create a framework to analyze the potential for a cooperative effort between China and the United States in East Africa. Although no model can completely cover the complexity of each causal factor or the weight a state applies to each, a reductionist method can highlight areas for further evaluation. In Chapter 3 the validity of this framework will be tested to explain why great powers were unable to intercede multilaterally before genocide erupted in Rwanda. After examining the causal factors of this multilateral failure, it will be applied to assess the potential for a cooperative stability effort between the United States and China in the East African region. Before employing the suggestive tool for examining great power cooperation, it is important to understand why great power cooperation is needed in East Africa.

Chapter 2

The Need for Cooperation in East Africa

We should recognize that the development goals of Africa do not simply benefit Africa, but are essential to our own national economic security.

Stephen Hayes, President and CEO, The Corporate Council on Africa

East Africa is a new frontier for global development and economic growth.

Historically, the idea of great power cooperation in East Africa was farfetched and states showed minimal interest in spending precious resources there.¹ For many Americans, the October 1993 loss of 18 soldiers during a botched raid to capture warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid in Somalia highlighted the region as a haven for instability. Since then, genocide has claimed the lives of approximately 800,000 people in Rwanda, civil war and disease has killed over 200,000 people in the Darfur region of Sudan, and the 2011 drought, which affected the entire East African region, has killed over 30,000 children. States in East Africa cannot establish stability without international cooperation.

Although many countries have assisted with humanitarian aid, peacekeeping forces, and other developmental assistance, the region remains relatively low in strategic importance to most states. So why should states outside of the African continent assist in developing East Africa? More importantly, why should the United States and China consider great power cooperation in East Africa?

The strategic importance of East Africa is growing. As globalization continues to shape the international environment, the importance of East Africa's role in the world is rising. Scarcity in resources combined with an economic downturn in the global economy has propelled great and medium powers to seek out developing markets. East Africa's relatively high expected growth rate of 6.3 percent in 2013, as well as its endowments of oil, natural gas, rare earth minerals, and other materials, has the potential to provide an economic foundation for regional stability.² Three main areas are driving East Africa's

¹ Bruce D. Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2001) 157 and President, Presidential Decision Directive 25, 6 May 1994, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm>.

² Emma Onyango, "East Africa: Region to Grow At 6.3 Percent in 2013," *East African Business Week*, 26 February 2013, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201302261437.html> (accessed 9 March 2013).

increase in strategic importance. First, new expeditions are discovering fossil fuel and material resource deposits in East Africa, which the United States and China require to sustain their growth. Second, the shift in demographics in the region towards a larger work force combined with significant potential for economic growth provides both great powers with a new market for economic trade. Third, if not managed properly, the instability in the region could spread throughout the continent and potentially affect the global environment.

The purpose of this chapter is to explain why great power cooperation is necessary in East Africa. The first part of this chapter defines and provides a brief background on the region. The second section explains the complexity of situation in the region and how several factors contribute to the cycle of instability. The third section explains why the timing may be right for a cooperative effort based on international and domestic desires for regional stability and development. In the concluding remarks, the argument is put forth that great powers and weak states can find common ground to increase development and stability in East Africa.

Background on East Africa

East Africa is a haven for instability. The current region, as defined by the African Union, encompasses the countries of Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania, along with the island nations of Comoros and Seychelles.³ Since gaining independence from their colonial powers, state governments have struggled to manage their territory and provide for their populations. Of the 13 states in the East African region, six rank in the top 20 on the 2012 Failed States Index.⁴ This index, which is a compilation of quantitative and qualitative data from the Fund for Peace, uses 12 categories ranging from demographic pressures to human rights and legitimacy of the government in order to gain a broad understanding of

³ United States Africa Command, *Statement of General Carter Ham: United States Africa Command before the House Armed Services Committee*, 29 February 2012, 5, <http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/testHam04052011.pdf>.

⁴ “Failed States: An Eighth Annual Collaboration between Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace,” *Foreign Policy* (2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failed_states_index_2012_interactive (accessed 8 March 2013).

a country's stability.⁵ Many of the issues which drive such a high ranking in the region come not only from internal state issues but also external factors such as transnational crime, refugees, and other external pressures that spread throughout the region from failed states such as Somalia and Sudan.




Figure 3. United States Africa Command's depiction of African regions

Source: *United States Africa Command, Statement of General Carter Ham: United States Africa Command before the House Armed Services Committee, 29 February 2012.*

Many states in the region are beginning to recognize that cooperation is required in order to advance their own development. Since the African Union Mission in Somalia began in 2007, with the objective of providing stability for the Transitional Federal Government, several East African states recognized the importance of stability in the region and dedicated troops to the peacekeeping mission.⁶ After acknowledging Somalia as the “principal source of instability in the Horn of Africa,” Joseph Siegel, the director

⁵ The Fund for Peace Publication CR-10-97-CA (11-05C), *Conflict Assessment Indicators: The Fund for Peace Country Analysis Indicators and Their Measures* (Washington, DC: Fund for Peace, 2011), 5.

⁶ Ted Dagne, *Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 2011), 10, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33911.pdf>.

of research at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, highlighted the cooperative stabilization effort between Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, and Ethiopia as having “made more progress than we’ve seen in the last 20 years.”⁷ This example highlights the regional approach individual states are taking and the acknowledgment that instability will not remain confined to one state. States are also beginning to acknowledge greater gains in economic growth from cooperative efforts in the region.

Although economic cooperation of different forms existed in the past, in 1999 Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda signed a treaty creating the East African Community. The mission statement for this organization is “to widen and deepen Economic, Political, Social and Culture integration in order to improve the quality of life of the people of East Africa through increased competitiveness, value added production, trade and investments.”⁸ In 2007, the commission expanded, adding the Republics of Rwanda and Burundi.⁹ Although the institution is relatively exclusive, incorporating only five of the 13 states in East Africa, it desires to increase its membership if states meet its democratic and capitalistic criteria. As of 2012, the countries of South Sudan and Somalia have applied for membership in this regional institution.¹⁰ The notions of cooperation in both security and economic matters provide hope that the region will eventually stabilize. Although states in East Africa must take ownership of the region, an international cooperative effort is likely required to overcome the cycle of instability that currently exists.

Causal Factors in the Cycle of Instability

World leaders cannot link instability and conflict in East Africa to one primary causal factor. The overall instability in the region stems from a combination of booming population growth, lack of food security, poor governance, violent conflict, criminal

⁷ Sara McGregor, “Clinton’s East Africa Trip Focuses on Oil, Somalia, Security,” *Bloomberg Business Week*, 2 August 2012, <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-08-02/clinton-s-east-african-trip-focuses-on-oil-somalia-and-security#p2> (accessed, 11 Feb 2013).

⁸ East African Community, “History,” http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=frontpage&Itemid=1 (accessed 7 March 2013).

⁹ East African Community, “History.”

¹⁰ East African Community, “Admission to the Community,” http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=frontpage&Itemid=1 (accessed 7 March 2013).

activity, and poverty. Each of these factors intertwines with the others creating a cycle of instability. The other major problem is that porous territorial borders allow the issues of one state to spill over into the rest of the region. Without a cooperative effort in regional development, this cycle of instability is likely to continue.

Population Growth

Africa has both the poorest population and the highest birthrate of any continent.¹¹ In 2010, the five states in the East African Community grew from a population of 105.8 million to 131.1 million people.¹² Scientists forecast that over the next 40 years, Africa's population will grow from one billion to 2.3 billion people. This boost will account for almost half of the world's projected population growth during the same period.¹³ As the population grows, many will move from agricultural centers to urban areas, thereby changing the economic environment. By 2050, researchers project that 1.3 billion Africans will reside in urban areas, up from roughly five million people in 1950.¹⁴ As families move from a self-sustaining agrarian lifestyle, higher demands will be placed on the state to provide greater food production and transportation infrastructure in order to sustain the increase in city populations. As high fertility rates and increases in life expectancy morph into a population explosion, additional demographics in the region will also change.¹⁵

Although there is potential for economic growth and stability, if mismanaged, the demographic shifts can enable corresponding unemployment, poverty, disassociation, and civil unrest to spiral out of control.¹⁶ “If the number of children in a country grows faster than the possibility to provide for the young generation with necessary schools, health institutions or food, protection and the ability to give meaningful jobs to the young people,” Janet Jackson, the United Nations Population Fund country representative

¹¹ David Smith, “Global Population Growth Fears Put to the Test in Africa’s Expanding Cities,” *The Observer*, 22 October 2011, <http://www.guardian.com.uk/world/2011/oct/22/global-population-growth-africa-cities> (accessed 15 February 2013).

¹² Francis Emorut, “Population Growth in EAC Worries UNFPA,” *New Vision*, 11 August 2012, <http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/634009-population-growth-in-eac-worries-unfpa.html> (accessed 15 February 2013).

¹³ Smith, “Global Population Growth Fears Put to the Test in Africa’s Expanding Cities.”

¹⁴ Smith, “Global Population Growth Fears Put to the Test in Africa’s Expanding Cities.”

¹⁵ Wolfgang Fengler, “East Africa: Kenya Poised for an Economic Take Off, Says World Bank,” *The East African*, 14 February 2011, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201102151375.html?page=3> (accessed 15 February 2013).

¹⁶ Emorut, “Population Growth in EAC Worries UNFPA.”

stated, “the situation of the entire country deteriorates.”¹⁷ The expected increase in the ratio of working age to non-working age members, as depicted in Figure 3, presents a major dilemma for regional leaders. State leaders must find ways to keep their population gainfully employed. If political leaders are unsuccessful in their developmental efforts, there is great potential for increased food shortages, civil unrest, and violent conflict.




Figure 4. Ratio of working age/non-working age population by sub-regions

Source: African Development Bank Group, “Briefing Notes for AfDB’s Long-Term Strategy: Briefing Note 4: Africa’s Demographic Trends” 7 March 2012, based on UN Population Division Data

Food Security

As the population in East Africa continues to explode, threats to food security will grow proportionally and propel a cycle of regional instability if not resolved. The 2011 drought in East Africa was not a short-lived humanitarian crisis, but a long-term threat to stability in Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, and other surrounding countries. The United Nations Children’s Fund estimated 13 million people needed humanitarian relief during the regional annual drought. Although several nations stepped up with humanitarian

¹⁷ Emorut, “Population Growth in EAC Worries UNFPA.”

relief, eight million East Africans remain in need of humanitarian assistance today.¹⁸

While the short-term relief during the crisis was a success, the underlying problems with food security in the region remain.

Although environmental disasters and changes in climatological conditions affect the opportunities for achieving food security in East Africa, it is not the primary causal factor. According to the United States Agency for International Development, “conflict, constrained access to humanitarian assistance, rising food and non-food prices and an upsurge in livestock disease,” damped its food security prognosis for the region in 2012.¹⁹ The United Nations noted that the number of refugees from Somalia seeking food and water in neighboring states has increased from 605,000 to 628,000 since the end of the 2011 drought.²⁰ While the drought had a major impact on the state, violent conflict associated with the terrorist organization Al Shabaab, combined with the inability to grow crops, worsened the crisis. This problem is not limited to Somalia. Food insecurity, as depicted in Figure 4, exists at some level in almost every East African state. These problems contribute to mass migrations throughout the region as people seek out humanitarian aid for survival.

The overflow of refugees into semi-stable states continues to threaten political leaders’ abilities to provide governance in rural territories. The world’s largest refugee camp at Dadaab, Kenya was designed for 90,000 people, yet contained over 380,000 refugees in the summer of 2011.²¹ Although rainfall increased in 2012 and boosted the region’s crop production, “most of the improvements in food security are supported by humanitarian response rather than substantial recovery in productive capacities or enhanced resilience of livelihoods.”²² The combination of population increases and ineffective subsistence farming can cripple a state’s ability to feed its population.²³ While

¹⁸ United Nations Children’s Fund: United States Fund, “Horn of Africa,” <http://www.unicefusa.org/work/emergencies/horn-of-africa/> (accessed 18 February 2013).

¹⁹ United States Agency for International Development, “East Africa Food Security Brief,” January 2012, Famine Early Warning System Network, http://www.fews.net/docs/Publications/East%20Africa%20Regional%20Brief%202012_01_final.pdf (accessed 18 February 2013).

²⁰ United Nations Children’s Fund: United States Fund, “Horn of Africa.”

²¹ Mark Tutton, “10 Million at Risk from East Africa drought,” CNN, 8 July 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-08/world/east.africa.drought_1_food-shortages-al-shabab-food-prices?_s=PM:WORLD (accessed 18 February 2013).

²² United States Agency for International Development, “East Africa Food Security Brief.”

²³ United States Agency for International Development, “East Africa Food Security Brief.”

states need humanitarian assistance during a crisis, the region requires long-term sustainable projects from the international community. “It is very important that our focus has to be on repatriating the people back to their home and providing them with some kind of infrastructure,” Iowa State Sociology Professor Abdi Kusow, a native of Somalia, said. “Somalis have been in Dabaab . . . for 20 years and if they’re in the refugee camp for the next 20 years too, that is not going to help. I think the key strategy would be to bring those people back to their homelands and give them some ways that they can survive,” he concluded.²⁴




Figure 5. Estimated food security conditions (October-December 2012)

Source: United States Agency for International Development, Famine Early Warning Systems Network for East Africa

The inability to transport food securely and efficiently between countries is a significant detractor from food security. Inside the East African region, Tanzania and

²⁴ Iowa State News Service, “Iowa State Sociologist, Migration Researcher Assesses the Current Crisis in Somalia,” Iowa State University, <http://archive.news.iastate.edu/news/2011/aug/Somalia> (accessed 18 February 2013).

Ethiopia were the largest suppliers of traded food commodities in 2011, while Kenya, Sudan, and South Sudan were the biggest net importers of food.²⁵ A lack of infrastructure development throughout the region combined with violent conflicts contributes to the inability for commercial and humanitarian resources to reach many of the poorest areas. In Sudan's southern areas, prices of white sorghum and wheat flour, a main staple in the country, saw an 80 percent increase from 2011 to 2012, because of trade disputes with its neighbor South Sudan.²⁶ For Sudan, a loss in oil revenue, combined with the fact that 40 percent of the rural population had to increase their budget allocation for food from 25 to 65 percent in 2012 suggests that future food prices could be cost prohibitive without international help.²⁷ Without external help and economic development in the region, food security issues will remain until East African governments can meet the needs of their population.

Governance

A lack of good governance in the region perpetuates the cycle of instability. The inability of state governments to provide food, security, and economic growth for a booming population threatens development in the region. In 2008 and 2009, East Africa had the smallest share of foreign direct investment of the five regions on the continent, largely due to an inadequacy in governance.²⁸ A lack of infrastructure and security forces, combined with vast rural areas with porous borders, have significantly contributed to the challenge East African leaders face in maintaining control of their states. Additionally, political instability along ethnic lines in Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan, and Somali, which flourished in the 1980s, has spilled over into other border states. Civil war ravished many of these countries as groups battled for political legitimacy. Although East African States are comparable to other regions in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of overall governance, the region remains an area of perceived corruption.²⁹

²⁵ The Market Analysis Sub-group of the Food Security and Nutrition Working Group, "East African Cross-Border Trade Bulletin: October-December 2011," <http://www.fews.net/docs/Publications/East%20Africa%20Cross-border%20Trade%20Bulletin%20February%202012.pdf> (accessed 18 February 2013).

²⁶ United States Agency for International Development, "East Africa Food Security Brief."

²⁷ The Market Analysis Sub-group of the Food Security and Nutrition Working Group, "East African Cross-Border Trade Bulletin: October-December 2011."

²⁸ African Development Bank, "Eastern Africa Regional Integration Strategy Paper: 2011 – 2015," September 2011, 3, <http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/East%20Africa%20-%20Rev%20RISP%20.pdf> (accessed 18 February 2013).

²⁹ African Development Bank, "Eastern Africa Regional Integration Strategy Paper: 2011 – 2015."

The inability to stop government corruption hinders economic growth and development in the region. “Corruption,” as Ian Taylor noted, “. . . is the cement that keeps the system together, yoking the patrons to their predatory ruling class.”³⁰ While many states and institutions are attempting to abolish the practice, it remains a means of conducting business and legal transactions. A survey conducted by Transparency International in the five East African Community states found that 40.7 percent of the population in Uganda, 39.1 percent in Tanzania, 29.5 percent in Kenya recognized bribery with governmental officials as normal.³¹ This unethical practice has placed greater costs on legitimate businesses and given unfair economic advantages to foreign countries and businesses willing to partake in the practice.

Democratic states in the region are not immune to corruption and suffer in the area of good governance. In 2011 five states in East Africa (Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda) registered on The Economist Intelligence’s Unit Democracy Index.³² However, stability has not been easy for these states. In Kenya’s 2007 elections, 1,300 people died in tribal clashes and 600,000 citizens were displaced before stability was finally restored.³³ The fear remained that Kenya’s 2012 elections would end in a similar tragedy; however, this did not come to fruition. Although governance is showing signs of improvement in the region, progress is required to break the cycle of instability and minimize the levels of violence that exist in East Africa.

Violent Conflict

Violent conflict, which is pervasive throughout the entire East African Region, varies in its forms from conventional interstate war to transnational terrorism and purely criminal behavior. Jeffrey Gettleman, *The New York Times* East Africa bureau chief, observed, “combat has morphed from soldier vs. soldier (now a rarity in Africa) to soldier vs. civilian. Most of today's African fighters are not rebels with a cause; they're

³⁰ Ian Taylor, *China’s New Role in Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 11.

³¹ Hussein Bogere, “Uganda Most Corrupt in East Africa,” *The Observer*, 31 August 2012, http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=20686:uganda-most-corrupt-in-east-africa (accessed 23 April 2013).

³² Lucas Liganga, “Tanzania: Govt Leads East Africa in Global Democracy Test,” *The Citizen*, 15 January 2012, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201201161809.html> (accessed 20 April 2013).

³³ “Kenya Election: Don’t Mention the War,” *The Economist*, 2 – 8 March 2013, 47.

predators.”³⁴ The rampant lawlessness that flows throughout the region threatens even well-intentioned states. Kenya, which boasts East Africa’s largest economy, was hit by terrorist bombings attributed to the Somalia based terrorist organization Al Shabaab.³⁵ Along with contributing to the fight against Al Shabaab inside Somalia, the state is currently combating pastoral violence and cattle raids in its North Rift Valley. Violence in this region sprouted from increased gun smuggling across the borders with Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia.³⁶ There are similar violent conflicts in Sudan as well. The war between Sudan and South Sudan helped proliferate weapons into the hands of civilians, which resulted in an escalation of violence and increased cattle raids.³⁷

A lack of opportunity and growth contributes to violence in the region. The inability to provide education and job opportunities for the population on the state level can result in higher crime rates, violence, and future instability.³⁸ The Lord's Resistance Army, which evolved out of a rebel movement in Uganda during the 1980s, is a perfect example of violent gangs that developed from groups with legitimate grievances, like poverty and marginalization.³⁹ Additionally, Al Shabaab has taken advantage of poverty in Somalia, offering \$100-300 in pay along with food and medical care to recruits for joining its terrorist organization.⁴⁰ “Boredom, idleness, and thrill-seeking impulses among youth,” Lauren Ploch stated in a congressional study on terrorism in East Africa, “may also be push factors for extremism, and, when combined with feelings of marginalization and frustrated expectations stemming from a lack of job opportunities in many East African countries, may make some Muslim youth more susceptible to

³⁴ Jeffrey Gettleman, “Africa's Forever Wars: Why the Continent's Conflicts Never End,” *Foreign Policy* (March/April 2010), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/africas_forever_wars?page=0,0 (accessed 18 February 2013).

³⁵ Scott Stewart, “Al Shabaab's Threat to Kenya,” *Stratfor Global Intelligence*, 26 Apr 2012, <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/al-shabaabs-threat-kenya> (accessed 20 February 2013).

³⁶ John Siebert and Kenneth Epps, *Addressing Armed Violence in East Africa: A Report on World Vision Peacebuilding, Development* (Mississauga, ON: World Vision Canada, 2009), 15 and Humanitarian Assistance Programmes, <http://www.worldvision.ca/Education-and-Justice/Policy-and-Analysis/Documents/ Addressing-Armed-Violence-in-East-Africa.pdf> (accessed 20 February 2013).

³⁷ Siebert and Epps, *Addressing Armed Violence in East Africa*, 57.

³⁸ Emorut, “Population Growth in EAC Worries UNFPA.”

³⁹ Gettleman, “Africa's Forever Wars.”

⁴⁰ Lauren Ploch, *Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response* (Washington, DC: The Congressional Research Service, 2010), 16, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41473.pdf> (accessed 12 February 2013).

recruitment by groups like Al Shabaab.”⁴¹ Similar factors, which can induce violent behavior, carry over into criminal acts of violence for profit.

Just as violent conflict impacts food security in the region, it is also a major obstacle to economic development. Threats of violence, which can disrupt oil production, are not new to East Africa. In 2007, the separatist Ogaden National Liberation Front attacked an oil field inside Ethiopia, killing 74 workers in the Ogaden region.⁴² Additionally, potential uprisings and criminal activity in Uganda led President Yoweri Museveni to secure the area around the Lake Albert oil fields with military force to quell dissenters.⁴³ Furthermore, the pipelines, which transport oil to the sea for export, run through ungoverned territories that lack significant infrastructure and security. Major oil producers in the region, such as Uganda and South Sudan, are landlocked, requiring pipelines through Kenya and Sudan in order to reach the sea for export. Disputes over pipeline transit fees, along with South Sudan’s support of northern rebels, threaten the oil industry in South Sudan.⁴⁴ Once oil and other supplies eventually reach the sea for export, criminal acts of piracy further threaten the stability of the region.

Piracy

The lack of economic prosperity and governance in Somalia led to an explosion of piracy around the Horn of Africa. These criminals threaten the stability of not only Somalia, but also the entire East African region. Many of the states in this region rely on fishing, tourism, and international trade in the maritime domain to sustain their economies.⁴⁵ In 2007, the number of pirate attacks in East Africa exceeded that of the Asian theater for the first time ever.⁴⁶ Since 2008, pirates based out of Somalia have threatened maritime access, executing over 800 attacks ranging from the Arabian Sea to

⁴¹ Ploch, *Countering Terrorism in East Africa*, 16.

⁴² Control Risk, *A New Frontier: Oil and Gas in East Africa*, 2012, 6, http://www.controlisks.com/Oversized%20assets/east_africa_whitepaper_LR_web.pdf (accessed 18 February 2013).

⁴³ Control Risk, *A New Frontier*, 8.

⁴⁴ “South Sudan Hopeful of Exporting Oil Through Kenya Pipeline by 2014,” *Sudan Tribune*, 16 February 2013, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article45540> (accessed 18 February 2013).

⁴⁵ Kennedy K. Mbekeani and Mthuli Ncube, “Economic Impact of Maritime Piracy,” *African Development Bank: Economic Brief*, 2 issue 10, (14 July 2011): 2, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Maritime%20Piracy_Maritime%20Piracy.pdf (accessed 12 February 2013).

⁴⁶ Mbekeani and Ncube, “Economic Impact of Maritime Piracy,” 5.

the Gulf of Aden.⁴⁷ The One Earth Future Foundation estimated in 2011 that piracy in the East African region cost the international community between \$6.6 and \$6.9 billion.⁴⁸

Seychelles' leaders estimated the loss in revenue from piracy at 4 percent of gross domestic product in 2009, and Kenya, where tourism accounts for 12 percent of gross domestic product, saw a reduction in revenue due to the threat of piracy between \$129 and \$795 million in 2011.⁴⁹ Another major systemic problem in the region is that between 80 and 90 percent of the food aid delivered to the 3.25 million dependent people in Somalia arrives from the sea and is vulnerable to piracy.⁵⁰ In 2011, 30 countries committed military forces, equipment, and vessels to the East African region at a cost of \$1.27 billion.⁵¹ These costs are astronomical for the international community when compared to the meager \$160 million pirates extorted from shipping companies and governments during the same year.⁵²

As economic trade increases in the region, transport ships will increase proportionally, creating more opportunities for piracy. Both Uganda and South Sudan are planning to build an oil pipeline through Kenya to export oil just off the coast of Somalia. As more oil is exported, the increasing number of slow oil tankers creates the potential for higher success rates in piracy attacks around the Horn of Africa. If a hijacking in the oil industry is successful, according to intelligence analyst Rory Lamrock, the “loss of income could be far more than the amount of ransom paid, which is currently at an average of \$4.8 million per vessel.”⁵³ On the surface, this may seem like solely a maritime problem; however, the root causes are regional and originate from land-based problems. Long-term solutions require a holistic approach that focuses on strengthening

⁴⁷ David Black, “Piracy a Major Drain for World Economy,” *The National*, 13 May 2012, <http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/industry-insights/economics/piracy-a-major-drain-for-world-economy> (accessed 10 February 2013).

⁴⁸ Oceans Beyond Piracy, *The Economic Cost of Somalia Piracy 2011*, One Earth Future Foundation, 1, http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/economic_cost_of_piracy_2011.pdf (accessed 10 February 2013).

⁴⁹ Mbekeani and Ncube, “Economic Impact of Maritime Piracy,” 1 and One Earth Future Foundation, *The Economic Cost of Somalia Piracy 2011*, 32-33.

⁵⁰ Mbekeani and Ncube, “Economic Impact of Maritime Piracy,” 5.

⁵¹ Oceans Beyond Piracy, *The Economic Cost of Somalia Piracy 2011*, 2.

⁵² Black, “Piracy a Major Drain for World Economy.”

⁵³ Rory Lamrock, “East African Energy Development Could Raise Future Maritime Security Concerns,” *Offshore*, <http://www.offshore-mag.com/articles/print/volume-72/issue-10/departments/beyond-the-horizon/east-african-energy-development-future-maritime-security-concerns.html> (accessed 18 February 2013).

regional security capabilities, economic development, governance, law, and multilateral cooperation in the region.⁵⁴

The Timing of International Cooperation

The potential for economic gains for foreign businesses in the East African region may provide incentive for a cooperative effort based on stability and development. East African states are growing in strategic significance. An expanding population of consumers, combined with new finds in oil and natural gas, may provide the catalyst for greater international support.

Economic Development

Although improvements in the financial sector will not resolve every issue, many state leaders in East Africa recognize the nexus between stability and economic growth in the region. Rwandan High Commissioner to the United Kingdom Ernest Rwamucyo said, “the whole basis of economic transformation of Rwanda is premised on tourism, financial services, regional trade, ICT (Information and Communication Technology) services and joint regional infrastructure projects. All these rely heavily on stability, peace and security.”⁵⁵ After surpassing the average economic growth rate in sub-Saharan Africa in 2000, the five East African Community states sustained an annual per capita income growth rate of 3.7 percent compared to 3.2 percent for the rest of sub-Saharan Africa from 2005 to 2010.⁵⁶ Much of this growth has occurred from greater exploration and extraction of resources. Developing economies in the Asia-Pacific region are fueling the demand for resources, thereby increasing economic trade in the region. These growth rates are fostering growth in the middle class.

As states develop and income increases, typically birth rates lower and life expectancy increases. These anticipated demographic changes in East Africa indicate the potential for economic growth in these countries if proper governance and policies are

⁵⁴ Lauren Ploch et al., *Piracy off the Horn of Africa* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 27 April 2011), 41, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/162745.pdf> (accessed 12 February 2013).

⁵⁵ Quoted in Sheena Kaliisa, “East Africa: Regional Stability Is Important to Rwanda,” *The New Times*, 13 October 2012, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201210130045.html> (accessed 18 February 2013).

⁵⁶ Hamid R. Davoodi, *The East African Community after Ten Years: Developing Integration*, International Monetary Fund, 16, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/afr/2012/121712.pdf>.

put in place.⁵⁷ For example, Kenya currently maintains a working-age population of 22 million, however, by 2050, it is expected to grow to 56 million.⁵⁸ Further decreases in child mortality rates from reductions of HIV/AIDS and communicable or chronic diseases are expected in the East African region, thereby creating a positive impact on longevity.⁵⁹ “Demographic trends,” according to a study by the African Development Bank Group, “are thus likely to provide an opportunity to reduce poverty and yield a demographic dividend that will lead to economic success as it did in the Asian emerging markets. . . .”⁶⁰ Greg Mills, director of the Brenthurst Foundation think-tank stated, “I don't see population growth as worsening a difficult situation, I see it as presenting an unprecedented opportunity—if governments respond in a way that they've failed to over the past 50 years.”⁶¹

The increases in growth and shift in demographics can provide benefits to states inside the East African region and abroad. As purchasing power increases, the demand for industrial goods increases, enabling a market for foreign trade. Although there is a movement afoot to focus on boosting internal trade in the region, the East African Community recognizes that achieving its objective of a single market and investment area will require a two-pronged approach based on free internal trade and liberal trade with the rest of the world.⁶² Right now, the region needs the investment in infrastructure and technological goods that global trade provides in order to sustain its development. If both population and economic growth are properly nurtured, cooperative efforts could bring stability to the region.

Resources

As previously mentioned, the main driver in economic growth in the region is the international trade of energy and material resources. East Africa is a virgin territory for oil exploration, yet potential exploitation is possible if states therein are not regulated

⁵⁷ African Development Bank, “Briefing Notes for AfDB’s Long-Term Strategy: Briefing Note 4: Africa’s Demographic Trends,” 7 March 2012, <http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/FINAL%20Briefing%20Note%204%20Africas%20Demographic%20Trends.pdf> (accessed 15 February 2013).

⁵⁸ Fengler, “East Africa: Kenya Poised for an Economic Take Off, Says World Bank.”

⁵⁹ African Development Bank, “Briefing Notes for AfDB’s Long-Term Strategy,” 3.

⁶⁰ African Development Bank, “Africa’s Demographic Trends.”

⁶¹ Smith, “Global Population Growth Fears Put to the Test in Africa’s Expanding Cities.”

⁶² Davoodi, *The East African Community after Ten Years*, 9.

properly. As one study noted, “after decades operating in the shadow of North and West Africa, East Africa is finally emerging as one of the most significant players in the continent’s oil and gas industry.”⁶³ In 2010, there were only 600 oil wells in East Africa compared with 14,000 wells in Western Africa and 20,000 in the North part of the continent.⁶⁴ Since then, major oil companies have shifted from the oil laden Northwest region of Africa to the East due to crude oil discoveries in Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea, along with natural gas in Tanzania.⁶⁵ “Uganda,” according to a study by the consulting agency Control Risk, “looks set to become one of the five largest oil producers on the continent, with its Lake Albert oil fields potentially capable of producing 200,000-350,000 barrels per day.”⁶⁶ If managed properly, oil revenues could boost economic prosperity and assist development in the entire region.

Conclusion

The problem of stabilizing the East African region is a tangled web of interlinked causal factors. Because of the complexity of the problem, a long-term holistic approach is required. Unfortunately the states in the region do not have the resources or expertise to resolve this problem alone. The porous nature of the borders in East Africa enables refugees, transnational criminals, and civil strife to traverse throughout the region. Although the solution must come from within Africa for long-term development and stability, solving the problem requires an international effort focused on a regional approach.

International leaders must decide if the costs of prevention outweigh the potential costs of instability and conflict. After the drought in 2011, Save the Children, a non-profit organization, estimated in its report *A Dangerous Delay*, that, “trucking five liters of water per day as a last-resort lifesaving intervention to 80,000 people in Ethiopia cost more than \$3 million for five months, compared to \$900,000 to prepare water sources in

⁶³ Control Risk, *A New Frontier*, 1.

⁶⁴ Control Risk, *A New Frontier*, 1.

⁶⁵ Matt Brown, “East Africa oil boom builds excitement,” *The National*, 18 May 2010, <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/africa/east-africa-oil-boom-builds-excitement> (accessed 18 February 2013).

⁶⁶ Control Risk, *A New Frontier*, 1.

the same area for an oncoming drought.”⁶⁷ The solution to instability, though it should be tailored to each state’s individual situation, involves good governance, economic growth, and improvements in infrastructure, education, and health. These programs are expensive and require resolve on the part of great powers and other states.

As interests converge, however, a multilateral effort that interlinks East African States with outside economic power is the only solution for stability. Increasing finds in resource exploration and potential economic growth in the region is driving an increase in great power interest. The African continent, though it must be involved in the solution, cannot provide long-term stability to the region without international help.

⁶⁷ Simon Tisdall, “East Africa’s Drought: The Avoidable Disaster,” *The Guardian*, 17 January 2012, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/18/east-africa-drought-disaster-report> (accessed 18 February 2013).

Chapter 3

Great Power Cooperation Failure in East Africa

Whereas Rwanda is viewed as a failure of early warning and conflict prevention, the events instead reflect a failure of early warning and conflict prevention, the events instead reflect a failure of concerted conflict management efforts: not a failure to take action, but a failure of actions taken.

Bruce Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda*

Great power cooperation aimed at increasing regional stability has varied in success throughout history. Although the reasons for success or failure are complex, it is important to identify areas of common ground between great powers. The common thread for cooperation during conflict resolution places higher emphasis on domestic interests. The purpose of this chapter is to understand why great power cooperation either fails or succeeds using the cooperative framework presented in Chapter 1. Evaluating the pressures exerted on states from the domestic, interstate, and international spheres, the proposition is put forth that the framework can help leaders identify potential areas for future great power cooperation. The case study examined in this chapter seeks to explain why the United States and France, allies in the international community with similar ideologies, failed to prevent the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The purpose of the case study is to evaluate why an effective cooperative effort failed to emerge between two democratic states with similar ideologies.

Inaction in Rwanda

On 6 April 1994, a plane carrying the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was shot down while returning from the Arusha Peace Accords between the ruling Hutu majority in Rwanda and Tutsi refugees.¹ This event ignited ethnic tensions that had been building and resulted in the senseless death of 800,000 Rwandans.² From April to July of 1994, the ruling Hutu ethnic group slaughtered an estimated 500,000 of 650,000 Tutsi living in

¹ Daniela Kroslak, *The Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide* (London, UK: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd, 2007), 46.

² Kroslak, *The Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide*, 1.

Rwanda along with many moderate Hutu.³ After the blood bath began and reports of genocide erupted, the international community remained sluggish to respond, even as the situation in Rwanda shifted from conflict resolution to crisis management. The ultimate end to the genocide came not from international intervention, but from the Rwandese Patriotic Front, an organization of refugees formed in Uganda, which called a ceasefire after gaining full control of the country on 18 July 1994.⁴

Outside of the United Nation's inadequacies, the ultimate failure to prevent this tragedy primarily lies with the inability of France and the United States to cooperate effectively. "Whereas Rwanda is viewed as a failure of early warning and conflict prevention," Bruce Jones observed, "the events instead reflect a failure of concerted conflict management efforts: not a failure to take action, but a failure of actions taken."⁵ This evaluation of the dilemma leaves two questions to answer. First, did France and the United States know the high risk of genocide that existed in Rwanda before April 1994? Second, if both states knew, why did the great powers not cooperate to prevent instability in the region? To evaluate the causal factors that led to the failure of two powerful states to cooperate and prevent this horrendous war, it is important to understand the context of instability in Rwanda.

Origin of the Tutsi/Hutu Ethnic Division

Germany's colonization of Rwanda in the 1890s manufactured a disastrous ethnic divide between the Hutu majority and Tutsi minority in the state.⁶ After the 1918 Treaty of Versailles expunged Germany's colonies in the aftermath of World War One, Belgium took control of the country, further exploiting the ethnic division German leaders created in Rwanda.⁷ Belgian rulers fueled the hatred and animosity between the two classes when it placed the Tutsi minority in charge of Rwanda in an effort to maintain control of its colony. After years of ethnic favoritism and imbalanced economic gains by the minority,

³ Alan J. Kuperman, *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2001), 20.

⁴ Kroslak, *The Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide*, 54.

⁵ Bruce D. Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 163.

⁶ Andrew Wallis, *Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France's Role in the Rwandan Genocide* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2006), 9.

⁷ Public Broadcasting Station, "Rwanda: A Historical Chronology," <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/rwanda/etc/cron.html> (accessed 3 April 2013).

Belgian leaders lost control of the population and switched their support to the Hutu majority prior to granting Rwanda its independence on 1 July 1962.⁸ This sudden shift in power infused massive instability and violence into the state. As the majority gained control, anti-Tutsi campaigns, which began in 1957, forced an estimated 700,000 Tutsi to flee Rwanda to find refuge in unwelcoming border states.⁹

After gaining independence, Rwanda's successive dictatorships remained hostile to Tutsi citizens. Massacres of Tutsi and increases in oppression resulted in further refugee flows out of the country. In 1973, the army chief of staff, General Juvenal Habyarimana, seized power in Rwanda by overthrowing Gregoire Kayibanda in a military coup. During his 21 years as president, Habyarimana continued the established cycle of Tutsi oppression through his policy and identity card system that sustained the division between Hutu and Tutsi.¹⁰ As oppression continued, the United Nations estimated that 480,000 Rwandan refugees lived in Burundi, Uganda, Zaire and Tanzania by the end of the 1980s.¹¹ In 1986 several border states complained of the burdens Rwandan refugees placed on their states; however, the Hutu regime would not repatriate large numbers of refugees due to the strain a population influx would have on its economy.¹² Tutsi and moderate Hutu refugees were on their own.

Roots of Civil War

As the oppression of Tutsi populations continued throughout the region, refugees gained strength and power in neighboring Uganda. When Uganda encountered domestic troubles, many of the Rwandan refugees being persecuted inside the state joined Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army to overthrow the dictatorship of Milton Obote. Once Museveni was in power, he elevated many of the refugees who fought alongside him to positions in his government. The most notable of these refugees was Paul Kagame, the future leader of the Rwandese Patriotic Front and President of Rwanda.¹³

⁸ Wallis, *Silent Accomplice*, 10.

⁹ Linda Melvern, *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide* (New York: St Martin's Press, Inc., 2000), 25 and Wallis, *Silent Accomplice*, 10.

¹⁰ Kroslak, *The Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide*, 29.

¹¹ United Nations, "Rwanda: A Brief History of the Country," Outreach Program on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/education/rwandagenocide.shtml> (accessed 3 April 2013).

¹² United Nations, "Rwanda: A Brief History of the Country."

¹³ Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, 27.

With the support of Ugandan leaders, the Rwandese Patriotic Front, originally a political group of Rwandan refugees, developed into a military force in the late 1980s.¹⁴ The refugee organization laid out a vision and plan seeking, “democracy for Rwanda, a self-sustaining economy, an end to the misuse of public offices, the establishment of social services, democratization of the security forces, a progressive foreign policy and the elimination of a system which generates refugees.”¹⁵

Once the Rwandese Patriotic Front gained sufficient power, it did not sit idly by as Hutu, encouraged by Habyarimana’s government, continued oppressing and murdering Tutsi. On 1 October 1990, against the advice of Ugandan President Museveni, the refugee force invaded Rwanda from Uganda.¹⁶ Although the Rwandese Patriotic Front was superior to Habyarimana’s forces, international military support from the Congo, Zaire, Kenya, Belgium, and France thwarted the rebel force’s efforts, causing surviving members to regroup in Uganda.¹⁷ As the fighting continued, a series of peace talks between the two sides began in Arusha, Tanzania in July 1992 due to pressure from the United States and France.¹⁸ Although these talks ultimately resulted in a ceasefire agreement on 12 July 1992, fighting again erupted on 8 February 1993 as the Rwandese Patriotic Force responded to the murder of 300 Tutsi during a violent protest against the new peace process organized by the *Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement*.¹⁹ After several negotiations, both sides signed a peace agreement on 4 August 1993 based on five main principles: adherence to the rule of law through democracy, national unity, and the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals; power sharing through a broad-based transitional government; integration of the two military forces into a single unified army; repatriation of Rwandan refugees; and an end to all root causes of war.²⁰

¹⁴ Kroslak, *The Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide*, 33.

¹⁵ Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, 29.

¹⁶ Kroslak, *The Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide*, 33 and Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, 30.

¹⁷ Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, 30.

¹⁸ Kroslak, *The Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide*, 40.

¹⁹ Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, 57.

²⁰ United Nations Peacemaker, “Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front,” 9 August 1994, http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/RW_930804_PeaceAgreementRwanda-RwandesePatrioticFront.pdf (accessed 3 April 2013).

In order to ensure compliance with the peace agreements, the United Nations Security Council authorized the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda on 5 October 1993. However, the force authorized was only one-third of the number of troops requested by Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire, the Canadian commander of the United Nations mission.²¹ Even with a less capable force, the pattern of conflict and the presence of United Nations members on the ground provide greater evidence that the international community knew the scope of the risks involved.

The genocide in Rwanda was not spontaneous, but well planned and organized in front of international observers. Genocide, as defined by Alain Destexhe, “is a conspiracy aimed at the total destruction of a group and thus requires a concerted plan of action.”²² Thirty months prior to the ethnic cleansing, extremists marked the locations and distributed lists of Tutsi and sympathetic Hutu.²³ Additionally, the Rwandan Army created the *Interahamwe*, a civilian militia, by gathering young men and providing them with weapons training that specialized in killing techniques.²⁴ After training was complete, military leaders ordered them to “make lists of Tutsis and await the call to arms.”²⁵ “In hindsight,” Daniela Kroslak noted, “one can trace the trail of genocide from the massacres in Kibilira in October 1990, of the Bigogwe in January 1991, in Bugesera in March 1992, in Kibuye in August 92, and in Giserenyi in early 1993.”²⁶

As the United States, France, and the international community became more involved in Rwanda, political leaders understood the high potential for massive atrocities. Rwanda was not a closed society, and its dependence on foreign aid opened up a plethora of intelligence sources. United States officials, according to Kroslak, “stated on several occasions that a CIA report was compiled warning that up to half a million Rwandan were in danger of being killed.”²⁷ On 11 January 1994, General Dallaire sent a message to the United Nations and later briefed the ambassadors of Belgium, the United States,

²¹ Kroslak, *The Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide*, 43.

²² Alain Destexhe, *Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century*, trans. by Alison Marshner (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 4.

²³ Kroslak, *The Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide*, 48.

²⁴ Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (Canada: Random House Canada, 2003), 142.

²⁵ Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 142.

²⁶ Kroslak, *The Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide*, 82.

²⁷ Kroslak, *The Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide*, 44.

and the charge d'affaires of France on training taking place in Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, to kill 1,000 Tutsi in twenty minutes.²⁸ A United Nations report published a week after the Arusha Accords in August of 1993 by the Commission on Human Rights concluded “serious human rights violations” were present and highlighted governmental organizations as contributors to these attacks while labeling Rwanda as a state with a high risk of genocide.²⁹ With information coming from multiple governmental and civilian sources along with the hate speech coming through radio broadcasts Wallis noted, “it is difficult to believe that the French government did not know that the planned ‘massacres’ heralded the start of a wider-scale policy of ‘annihilation’.”³⁰ If both France and the United States understood the stakes at hand, why did they fail to cooperate?

Domestic Sphere

Although significant similarities existed between the United States and France, neither domestic interests nor policy aligned in Rwanda. This division was ultimately the result of a self-imposed competition France pursued in the region against British influence. Additionally, the United States held little interest in the region and shaped its policy on minimal assistance. The combination of these two divergent political motivations hampered the opportunity for a successful cooperative effort in the region.

French Interests

During the latter half of the twentieth century, France, in an attempt to regain international influence, pursued its interests in areas uncontested by other powers. This concept placed greater importance on the role of Africa in French international relations. “Africa is the only continent that remains within France's capacities and means. . . .” French Minister of Foreign Affairs Louis de Guiringaud said in the late 1970s, “the only one where it can still change the course of history with 500 men.”³¹ Although the majority of France’s partner states were in Northern and Central Africa, Rwanda was the focus of a significant part of France’s influence. France valued a relationship with Rwanda more than any other power.

²⁸ Kroslak, *The Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide*, 93.

²⁹ Kroslak, *The Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide*, 92.

³⁰ Wallis, *Silent Accomplice*, 83.

³¹ Kroslak, *The Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide*, 60.

France's involvement in Rwanda hinged on three main national interests. First, France remained committed to its ties between Paris and Francophone Africa in order to advance its culture.³² Although Rwanda was a former colony of Belgium, France quickly became its greatest supporter after Rwanda gained its independence. "Rwanda was important not because French was its second language," Linda Melvern observed, "but because Rwanda was located on a political fault-line between francophone and Anglophone east Africa".³³ The post-Cold War environment, which dissolved the Western nation's common enemy, enabled competition between France and England to return. For politicians in Paris, it was critical that French culture and influence continue to spread in order to balance British and American influence.

The second main interest, closely tied to the first, focused on increasing France's influence in international politics.³⁴ After Germany conquered France in World War Two, the state struggled to maintain the international swagger it once had as a great power. The loss of its colonies in Vietnam in 1954, Tunisia in 1956, Morocco in 1956, and Algeria in 1962 due to violent struggles for independence, further reduced its power. Although France still had a nuclear arsenal, a relatively strong economy, and a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, it was losing credibility as a great power, something French leaders did not want to accept. On 26 June 1994, Nicolas Sarkozy, speaking for the French government on Operation Turquoise in Rwanda, argued, "we are not a middle power, we are a great power. . . ."³⁵ In the eyes of French leaders, a relationship with Rwanda helped the declining state regain its stature in the international community.

The third interest which drove French involvement in Rwanda revolved around economic trade. "As in the political sphere," Kroslak wrote, "Africa has always been an important economic partner for France in maintaining its ambition to be seen as a world player."³⁶ As larger nations steered away from regions of instability in Africa, France pursued bilateral relations with states like Rwanda both for resource extraction and to open up markets to export French manufactured goods to the region. Under France's

³² Kroslak, *The Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide*, 60.

³³ Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, 24.

³⁴ Kroslak, *The Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide*, 60.

³⁵ Kroslak, *The Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide*, 61.

³⁶ Kroslak, *The Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide*, 64.

tutelage and greater influxes of humanitarian aid, Rwanda actually showed signs of economic improvement in the 1980s. However, the escalation of war in the 1990s drove the state to transform economic gains into weapons. From 1992 to 1994, Rwanda, a country of 7.8 million people, spent \$100 million in arms deals and was sub-Saharan Africa's third largest purchaser of weapons.³⁷ In order to boost economic growth and political influence, France brokered a twelve-million dollar deal for a domestic company to sell Rwanda "40,000 grenades, 29,000 bombs, 7 million rounds of ammunition, 1,000 truncheons, 1,000 pistols and 5,000 AK 47s. . ."³⁸ This was significant because in its pursuit of self-interest and influence in Rwanda, France snubbed the European Union's 1992 directive for ethical arms sales designed to prevent weapons from entering regions engaged in conflict.³⁹ The limited accessibility of Rwanda, combined with little outside influence, allowed France's pursuit of its interests to go unchallenged.

United States Interests

The United States, on the other hand, had little interest in Rwanda. For American political and business leaders, the state held little in the form of energy or mineral resources to sustain United States economic growth. At the time of the Arusha Accords, the United States had only one foreign direct investment in the entire state.⁴⁰ Since America could gain little economically, its primary interests were human rights and peace in the region. Although it's small embassy in Kigali did not contain many of the normal staff positions, such as a political officer, defense attaché, or Central Intelligence Agency office, it had an Agency for Development representative for humanitarian and economic aid.⁴¹ Rwanda's economy was heavily dependent on foreign aid during the 1970s and 1980s, and American leaders at the time related stability in the region with success stories in humanitarian aid.⁴²

French Policy

³⁷ Wallis, *Silent Accomplice*, 31.

³⁸ Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, 55.

³⁹ Wallis, *Silent Accomplice*, 31.

⁴⁰ Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda*, 75.

⁴¹ William Ferroggiaro, "The U.S. and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994: Information, Intelligence and the U.S. Response," *The National Archive*, 24 March 2004, The National Security Archive: The George Washington University, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB117/> (accessed 3 April 2013).

⁴² Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda*, 61.

In order to pursue self-interests in Africa, France preferred bilateral agreements with authoritative and easily influenced regimes. “For the past 40 years,” Bruce Crumley wrote, “Paris has dealt with its former African colonies under an interventionist policy called *Françafrique*, under which France propped up client regimes in Africa in order to maintain its political and business interests on the continent.”⁴³ Although France is a democratic nation, it turned a blind eye to the oppressive nature of the political leaders in Rwanda. This pattern began in October of 1962 when President de Gaulle signed an agreement for economic, cultural, and technical cooperation with Rwandan head of state Gregoire Kayibanda, whose oppressive policies resulted in Tutsi massacres.⁴⁴ After President Habyarimana came to power through a bloodless military coup in 1973, France continued to ignore the refugee problems and signed an agreement with Rwanda to provide military cooperation and training.⁴⁵

Although the fall of the Berlin Wall fostered a new birth for the expansion of individual freedom, France pursued the democratic changes it espoused to Rwandan leaders at the La Baule Summit with little resolve. As Belgium and Germany tied financial aid to democratic reform in Rwanda, France continued to support the Habyarimana government with financial and military aid through a few-strings-attached policy.⁴⁶ Whether democratic or totalitarian, France was committed to supporting Hutu regimes in Rwanda.

France pursued its interest for influence in the region through ill-conceived biases towards Hutu regimes. Leaders in Paris characterized Tutsi as Ugandan Anglophones, due to their proclivity for the English language and the attendance of American military academies by several members of the Rwandese Patriotic Front.⁴⁷ Although the Tutsi had valid grievances over human rights violations and ethnic cleansing, France remained committed with military force and weapons sales to support the Hutu regime. French

⁴³ Bruce Crumley, “France’s Belated Mea Culpa on Rwanda,” *Time*, 26 February 2010, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1968392,00.html> (accessed 2 April 2013).

⁴⁴ Wallis, *Silent Accomplice*, 10.

⁴⁵ Wallis, *Silent Accomplice*, 26 and Jakkie Cilliers, “Still . . . France versus the Rest in Africa?” *African Security Review* 10, no. 3 (2001): 2, <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/asr/10No3/Cilliers2.html> (accessed 2 April 2013).

⁴⁶ Krosnak, *The Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide*, 32, 63.

⁴⁷ Wallis, *Silent Accomplice*, 26.

leaders saw Rwanda as a “victim of external aggression” as opposed to a country fighting a civil war.⁴⁸

“Secretly, as with the arming of the Rwandan troops,” Wallis noted, “Paris put in place an officer who not only directed French forces, but also became head of the Rwandan government army, with the role of direct military adviser to Habyarimana and his chief of staff, Colonel Laurent Serubuga.”⁴⁹ While its forces sustained the attacks against the Rwandese Patriotic Front, French banks provided the medium for legitimate light weapons sales with other African countries, which enhanced the speed of lethality during the genocide.⁵⁰

United States Policy

A lack of significant interests in Rwanda prevented United States policy from employing the resources required for an effective cooperative effort for stability. American policy, as Jones observed, “was largely motivated by a concern to secure peaceful conditions throughout Africa, a standing concern of the State Department since the end of the Cold War.”⁵¹ However, political leaders saw the best solution to this problem was through financial aid and diplomacy. With Somalia fresh in their minds, the majority of public and political opinion centered on the idea that, “their soldiers were not to be risked in containing ‘endless African civil wars’.”⁵² Instead, the United States sought its interest for peace in the region through diplomatic support of ceasefire agreements and the Arusha Accords.

Neither political nor popular will supported further intervention in Rwanda. Stability operations in Somalia, which resulted in 18 American lives lost on 4 October 1993, were engrained in the public’s mind. In response to the fiasco in Somalia, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 25 to place restrictions on the commitment of forces to peacekeeping operations.⁵³ This directive, which was signed in the middle of the Rwandan genocide on 6 May 1994, provided guidance to reduce United States costs for United Nations peace operations, to participate only when operations advance

⁴⁸ Kroslak, *The Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide*, 142.

⁴⁹ Wallis, *Silent Accomplice*, 33.

⁵⁰ Wallis, *Silent Accomplice*, 31.

⁵¹ Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda*, 75.

⁵² Shaharyar M. Khan, *The Shallow Graves of Rwanda* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000), 199.

⁵³ Eric A. Heinze, “The Rhetoric of Genocide in U.S. Foreign Policy: Rwanda and Darfur Compared,” *Political Science Quarterly* 122, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 363.

American interests, and only when United States forces are required for the success of the mission.⁵⁴ When questioned on Rwanda's potential to become a trouble spot several months before the genocide took place, "high-level administration officials," according to Eric Heinze, "are reported to have responded, 'Take (Rwanda) off the list. . . US national interest is not involved . . . just make it go away'."⁵⁵ The United States' unwillingness to label the violence in Rwanda as genocide until six weeks after the killing began further demonstrates President Clinton's unwillingness to get involved in Rwanda.⁵⁶

Interstate Sphere

The interstate sphere provided no significant support for a cooperative effort to form in Rwanda. Although the United States and France have a history of reciprocity, individual interests, unrelated to mutual security, prohibited greater cooperation. Attempts at cooperation may have been prompted by the longevity of the two powers' relationship and acknowledgement of future interactions. However, the United States' lack of perceived future relations with Rwanda negated greater expenditures of resources towards an effective cooperative effort to help stabilize the region.

France and United States' History of Reciprocity

International relations between France and the United States have varied historically from conflict to cooperation. In 1778 France became America's first ally, providing troops, supplies, and ships to defeat a common enemy during the American Revolution. During World Wars One and Two, American forces came to support the French government against German aggression. As France rebuilt itself in the aftermath of World War Two, a greater sense of nationalism was afoot. In the 1960s, President Charles de Gaulle reestablished France's history of independent policy-making and promoted French pride as a counterbalance to the United States' influence around the world.⁵⁷ At first France went along with United States institutionalism in the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a collective defense against potential Soviet aggression. However, in 1966, President Charles de Gaulle led France to withdraw its

⁵⁴ President, Presidential Decision Directive 25, 6 May 1994, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm>.

⁵⁵ Heinze, "The Rhetoric of Genocide in U.S. Foreign Policy," 364.

⁵⁶ Heinze, "The Rhetoric of Genocide in U.S. Foreign Policy," 360, 366.

⁵⁷ Paul Belkin, *France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S.-French Relations* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 14 Apr 2011), 1.

military from the institution. He was concerned that United States nuclear forces were not enough to protect France and desired to part ways with American influence.⁵⁸ After the end of the Cold War, similar areas of cooperation and competition continued to exist between France and the United States.

Although there are many cases of reciprocity throughout the history of their relationship, France's desire to maintain a significant influence in the African region overwhelmed its ability to reciprocate cooperation effectively. French and American diplomats began unofficial peace talks with the warring parties in the fall of 1991 and according to Jones, "meetings with Rwandan participants ran in parallel, although each side kept the other informed of developments through working-level contacts."⁵⁹

The major stumbling block for carrying a cycle of reciprocity into Rwanda was France's perception of United States' support for the Rwandese Patriotic Front. Although both states wanted peace in the region, French leaders perceived greater cooperation could shift the imbalance of influence in Rwanda. France failed to see greater cooperation as a positive-sum gain for the two powers and the region. French leaders were wedded to the maintenance of the Hutu government for sustained influence and the fact that President Francois Mitterrand considered President Habyarimana a personal friend.⁶⁰ If the Hutu regime were removed, France would not only lose an ally but most certainly lose any power it held in Rwanda, as the Tutsi, whom France fought against, secured governmental positions.

Longevity

Since America's proclamation of independence, France and the United States have maintained a significant international relationship. Although French and American relations have been strained at times, both countries recognized the importance and longevity of their interactions and need for reciprocity. While the two powerful states maintained long-term relations, the proclivity of the two states towards long-term relations with Rwanda varied significantly.

⁵⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO Update: 1966," <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/60-69/1966e.htm> (accessed 2 April 2013).

⁵⁹ Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda*, 57.

⁶⁰ Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, 24.

France saw its influence in the region tied to sustained relations with Rwanda, more specifically the Hutu regime. Even though Hutu leadership was promoting genocidal tendencies through its unwillingness to prevent ethnic massacres, France continued its support for Habyarimana's regime. France's support for the regime in the 1990s, which included military training, equipment, and French fighting forces, highlights its desire to remain influential inside the state. After the Rwandese Patriotic Front breached the ceasefire agreement in 1993, the French military stepped in again with helicopters and artillery fire to prevent the Tutsi force from taking Kigali.⁶¹ France further demonstrated its long-term plan for Rwandan leadership in its extraction of high-ranking Hutu leaders from the fields of genocide during Operation Turquoise.

The United States, on the other hand, did not consider Rwanda a significant strategic interest. As one National Intelligence Officer noted after the Rwandese Patriotic Front first invaded the state from Uganda in 1990, "his first task," according to Jones, "was to locate Rwanda on an atlas."⁶² Another demonstration of Rwanda's lower status among American polices was the limited size and minimal composition of governmental agencies inside the Embassy.⁶³ Limited gains complemented the Clinton administration's unwillingness to use American blood or significant treasure to provide stability in the region. As the genocide progressed, the United Nations Security Council, with support from the United States, voted unanimously to reduce its force in Rwanda from 2,100 to 270 soldiers.⁶⁴ Furthermore, when intelligence reports of genocide emerged from numerous sources, President Clinton's administration avoided categorizing the violence in Rwanda as genocide until 21 May, according to Heinze, "for fear that using it would have obliged the United States to take action under the terms of the 1948 Genocide Convention."⁶⁵ This lack of concern to intercede, even after violence occurred, further demonstrates the perceived lack of longevity in a relationship with Rwanda.

⁶¹ Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, 58.

⁶² Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda*, 53.

⁶³ Ferroggiaro, "The U.S. and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994."

⁶⁴ Heinze, "The Rhetoric of Genocide in U.S. Foreign Policy," 364.

⁶⁵ Heinze, "The Rhetoric of Genocide in U.S. Foreign Policy," 360, 366.

International Sphere

The perceived minimal gains in prestige and legitimacy did not compel the two states to expend additional resources on a cooperative effort. Rwanda was relatively insignificant on the global scale and few countries had any ties to the region. Although neither state expected to achieve major gains in international image, French and American leaders ultimately came to this conclusion for different reasons.

Prestige

In France, the loss in prestige via discovery of French support for the oppressive Hutu regime countered the prestige the state could hope to gain from a cooperative effort. “Maintaining status and prestige,” according to Kroslak, “has always represented one of Paris’ main goals in Africa.”⁶⁶ In the 1990s, France recognized its inability to “bear the burden of Africa’s economic development alone.”⁶⁷ As war developed in Rwanda, France was beginning to see the need for international assistance, as the continued use of force to protect the Rwandan government from Major General Kagame’s rebel army was not sustainable. However, France remained aligned with the Hutu regime.⁶⁸ If a cooperative effort enabled Tutsi leaders to gain power in Rwanda, the atrocities that France turned a blind eye to may have exposed France’s involvement, thereby lowering its prestige in the international community. The best situation France could have hoped for was a peaceful settlement, which kept Habyarimana in power to sustain its influence, and the international prestige from brokering a peace deal.

For the United States, the minimal bump in prestige from a successful cooperative effort was not worth the risk of action. After emerging victorious from the Cold War as the sole superpower, the United States found itself in a rare position of power in world history. As the dominant power and sustainer of international order, as demonstrated by the effectiveness of military force exerted on Iraq in 1991, America held a great level of international prestige in the 1990s. However, America took a hit in prestige when it chose to withdraw forces from Somalia in the fall of 1993 after a failed attempt at stabilizing the region and the loss of several soldiers. The memories of Somalia shaped American views

⁶⁶ Kroslak, *The Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide*, 71.

⁶⁷ Kroslak, *The Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide*, 67.

⁶⁸ Destexhe, *Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century*, 71.

on intervening in Rwanda, reinforcing the idea that further attempts to maintain stability in Africa could present yet another decline in American prestige.

Legitimacy

A cooperative effort for stability in Rwanda would have furthered the legitimacy of France and the United States from both a regional and international perspective. African states wanted stability in the region and the ability to assist in this process could have advanced French and American interests by helping overcome Cold War stigmas. The Organization of African Unity, which formed into the African Union on 9 July 2002, was a major proponent of peace in Rwanda. When war broke out inside Rwanda in 1990, the Organization of African Unity, United Nations, France, and the United States joined forces and became involved in developing a peace process.⁶⁹ As talks between the Rwandan government and Rwandese Patriotic Front progressed, the Organization of African Unity, France and the United States were observers of the Arusha Peace Accords. The support of these organizations and states continued in variations of support in the years leading up to the genocide. The mutual support of regional and international states and institutions provided an avenue for France and the United States to further their interests in the region with greater legitimacy. Although peace was a legitimate goal for a cooperative effort between France and the United States, it was not enough to overcome a lack of interest in the region.

Conclusion

The tragedy in Rwanda, albeit preventable, was at least partially a result of a failure of the United States and France to cooperate and provide regional stability. One of the main causal factors of the genocide was, according to Jones, “international interest in Rwanda was limited, which caused less attention to be paid and fewer resources to be devoted to conflict management than the situation demanded.”⁷⁰ Inside the domestic sphere, neither self-interests nor the policy decisions of France and the United States aligned. The fact that the United States had little interest in Rwanda and France’s plans depended on support of the oppressive Hutu regime were the most significant causes of

⁶⁹ Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda*, 54.

⁷⁰ Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda*, 157.

failure. Inside the interstate sphere, although longevity existed between the two powers, France's desire to maintain influence in the region prevented an effective cooperative agreement from emerging. Additionally, the United States' inability to recognize Rwanda as a long-term interest further decreased its desire to allocate sufficient resources to cooperate more effectively. Although both powers stood to gain from additional prestige and legitimacy in the regional and international environment, the weight of this international pressure was not strong enough to overcome the domestic and interstate pressures each state faced. These observations are categorized and presented in Table 1. Rwanda, much like other "... experiences in the 1990s," according to Kuperman, "demonstrated that although the international community has sufficient will to intervene in many conflicts, it rarely has sufficient will to devote the resources necessary to intervene effectively."⁷¹

⁷¹ Kuperman, *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention*, 116.

Table 1. Cooperative framework between France and United States in Rwanda

	Common Ground	France	United States
Domestic Sphere	Did not Coincide		
Interests	NO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain French cultural influence Gain influence in international politics Economic growth 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Peace in the region Advancement of human rights
Policy	NO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bilateral engagement Linked to Hutu regime Military support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Diplomacy Humanitarian aid
Interstate Sphere	Potential to Coincide		
Historical Relationship of Reciprocity	NO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inside Africa, France was committed to limiting Anglo-American influence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Focused on national security and economic trade
Longevity	YES/NO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> United States: Yes Rwanda: Hutu Regime 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> France: Yes Rwanda: No
International Sphere	Potential to Coincide		
Prestige	NO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Positive gain if Hutu remain in power Negative if Tutsi gain power 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimal gain if cooperation succeeds
Legitimacy	YES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regional and International influence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Potential for gains to spread into regional legitimacy

Source: Author's own work

Chapter 4

The United States, China, and East Africa

Competition is inevitable, but competition does not preclude cooperation. . . what we need now is for the leaders in the United States and China to find the courage necessary to seek common ground and elevate international development among its highest priorities.

Stephen Hayes, President and CEO, The Corporate Council on Africa

As China and the United States increase their presence in East Africa, discord will reveal opportunities for conflict as well as cooperation. Scarcities in global resources along with competing economies create an environment of tension and escalating national security measures.¹ However, unlike United States and Soviet relations during the Cold War, China and the United States maintain a political interdependence tied to economic growth.² As the world's two largest economies, "the stakes are too high to allow old hostilities to impede constructive cooperation," said Former Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, "virtually no global challenge can be met without China-U.S. cooperation."³ Although power relationships and state interests have not coincided in the past, shifts in the international system, global economic strife, resource competition, and complex regional instability in East Africa are advancing the need for great power cooperation. The timing may be right for a cooperative effort outside the two great powers' spheres of influence which can help stabilize a region, meet economic interests of both great powers, and enhance international order.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the potential for cooperation in East Africa using the framework presented in Chapter One. In order to examine the salient areas of a cooperative agreement focused on advancing stability and development,

¹Jan van Rooyen and Hussein Solomon, "The Strategic Implications of the US and China's Engagement within Africa," *Scientia Militaria South African Journal of Military Studies* 35, no. 1 (2007): 2, http://www.militaryacademy.ac.za/scientia_militaria/default.cfm (accessed 18 February 2013).

² Deborah Welch Larson and Alexi Shevchenko, "Status Concerns and Multilateral Cooperation," in *International Cooperation: The Extents and Limits of Multilateralism*, ed. I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 201.

³ William S. Cohen, "The World Depends on U.S.-China Cooperation: The Two Countries have Many Shared Interests," *The Wall Street Journal*, 23 April 2009, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124044163563445423.html> (accessed 20 February 2013).

several complex factors must be simplified. For this purpose, the analysis presented in this chapter will focus primarily on the United States and China. Although East African states are stakeholders in a cooperative effort, variances in interests and domestic differences increase the complexity of the problem beyond the scope of this paper. The first section of this chapter seeks to examine how the domestic sphere impacts a cooperative agreement by comparing Sino-American interests and policies in East Africa. The second section evaluates the interstate sphere through the lens of historical relationships based on reciprocity and longevity between the United States, China, and East Africa. The final section looks at the international sphere and provides an assessment of gains the two great powers could perceive in international prestige and legitimacy from such an effort.

The Domestic Sphere

The starting point for analyzing a potential cooperative effort should occur in the domestic sphere with understanding the interests of the two great powers and the policies each employs to achieve those interests. This section receives the bulk of analysis because in a cooperative effort outside of crisis, states place more emphasis on finding common ground between interests and ideologies.⁴ Although both great powers have differences in interests and policies, each requires development and stability in the East African region to advance their common interests.

China's Interests in East Africa

China has significant interests in the region as an emerging area for economic and social development. China's primary political objective is economic growth and domestic development inside its borders to placate its 1.34 billion citizens. A significant portion of China's population remains unemployed or underemployed, enabling further potential for economic growth as China's labor force moves from agriculture to manufacturing.⁵ However, a large idle population can also lead to political instability if economic growth collapses. Africa has the "energy sources, raw materials, markets, vast and underutilized

⁴ Benjamin Miller, *When Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conflict and Collaboration in World Politics* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1995), 33.

⁵ Chris Alden et al., *China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace* (New York: Columbia University, 2008), 31.

arable land to help feed its billions, (and) United Nations general-assembly votes” China requires to pursue its own domestic growth and development.⁶ During his testimony before a Congressional Subcommittee on African Affairs, former United States Ambassador to Ethiopia David Shinn postulated that “China has essentially four hard interests in Africa.”⁷ These four interests can be divided between two economic aims and two political goals.⁸

First, China’s ability to maintain economic growth is heavily dependent on its strategic pursuit of energy, material, and agricultural resources to support its population and global manufacturing industry.⁹ While East Africa contains numerous mineral resources such as gold, steel, chromite, and bauxite, exploration for oil and natural gas is driving higher interests in the region.¹⁰ In 1993, China transitioned away from net exportation of oil, and, by 2004, the developing great power became the second largest oil importer in the world.¹¹ By 2005, oil exported from Africa accounted for 31 percent of China’s daily consumption rate.¹² If China’s annual oil demand continues to increase at seven percent per year as projected, it will meet the United States’ current level of oil consumption in 2025.¹³ Unlike the United States and other Western developed countries whose demand for oil and resources has somewhat plateaued, China is developing. Although China is catching the United States in terms of gross domestic product, the disparity between the two great powers of per capita gross domestic product in 2011 was \$5,445 for China compared to \$48,112 in the United States.¹⁴ This trend illuminates a potential explosion of purchasing power in China linked to great potential for development. As the disposable income of China’s population increases, its demand for

⁶ Lt Col J.S. Kohli, “The Dragon on Safari: China’s Africa Policy,” *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Special Report* 86 (October 2009): 6, http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR86-China-Kohli-Final.pdf (accessed 2 January 2013).

⁷ Senate, *China’s Role in Africa: Implications for U.S. Policy: Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations*, 112th Cong., 1st sess., 2001, 5.

⁸ Senate, *China’s Role in Africa*, 5.

⁹ Alden et al., *China Returns to Africa*, 7.

¹⁰ Thomas Yeager et al., “United States Geological Survey 2010 Minerals Yearbook: Africa (Advanced Release),” United States Department of the Interior, 1.16, <http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2010/myb3-sum-2010-africa.pdf> (accessed 20 February 2013).

¹¹ Alden et al., *China Returns to Africa*, 88.

¹² Ian Taylor, *China’s New Role in Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009), 162.

¹³ Rooyen and Solomon, “The Strategic Implications of the US and China’s Engagement within Africa,” 5.

¹⁴ World Bank, “GDP Per Capita (Current \$US),” <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD>.

oil and resources will expand drastically. In order for China to maintain a significant draw of oil resources from East Africa, stability is a must in the region.

Second, to sustain China's current economic growth rate, political leaders must also find additional markets to export manufactured goods. Chinese political and business leaders are not pessimistic about Africa's outcome but see the continent as "economic potential populated by consumers."¹⁵ In sub-Saharan Africa, Chinese exports increased from \$4.4 billion in 2001 to \$56.3 billion in 2011.¹⁶ In 2009, China surpassed the United States as Africa's biggest trading partner.¹⁷ Although increases in exports to the region help China domestically, a large influx of cheap goods could detrimentally impact local businesses in Africa, thereby limiting China's future growth. By comparison, China's exports to Africa increased 712 percent from 1996 to 2005 while its imports from Africa increased only slightly (from 2.5 to 7.4 percent) during the same period.¹⁸

Although East Africa is developing, the significant lack of communication infrastructure, manufacturing base, transportation, and skilled workers limit the region's ability to export goods the world desires at a fair price.¹⁹ Transportation and insurance costs involved in distributing goods can be in excess of 30 percent of a product's value in landlocked countries.²⁰ Even with vast amounts of regional natural resources, Sudan was the only state in East Africa able to create at least one annual trade surplus between 2000 and 2010.²¹ If this trend continues and China drives out East Africa's manufacturing capabilities by flooding the market with cheap goods, it may limit its growth potential by eliminating local jobs and damaging the legitimacy it seeks as Africans develop "Sino-phobic resentment".²² Although it ignored this problem for years, China is beginning to

¹⁵ Alden et al., *China Returns to Africa*, 7.

¹⁶ Government Accountability Office, *Sub-Saharan Africa: Trends in U.S. and Chinese Economic Engagement*, GAO-13-199 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, February 2013), 19, 24.

¹⁷ Government Accountability Office, *Sub-Saharan Africa*, 19.

¹⁸ Taylor, *China's New Role in Africa*, 63.

¹⁹ Kohli, "The Dragon on Safari," 7.

²⁰ Alden et al., *China Returns to Africa*, 137.

²¹ United Nations, "Total Imports and Exports by Regions and Countries or Areas (Table A)," <http://www.comtrade.un.org/pb/FileFetch.aspx?docID=4044&type> (accessed 20 February 2013).

²² Taylor, *China's New Role in Africa*, 86.

recognize the negative trend. The state is now building manufacturing plants, such as shoe factories in Ethiopia, to help increase the number of African consumers.²³

Third, increasing favorability among African states for “political clout in multilateral forums such as the World Trade Organization and the United Nations” is another political interest China has in East Africa.²⁴ The trend of gaining African allies to leverage international support is not new to China. In the 1970s, the Chinese Communist Party leveraged developing states to convince the voting body of the United Nations that it deserved the Republic of China’s (Taiwan) permanent seat on the Security Council.²⁵ The post-colonial influx of newly independent African states into the United Nations helped create a larger voting block for third-world nations and helped China receive the required votes.²⁶ Additionally, when Western nations enforced sanctions on China for human rights violations during the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, several African nations were indifferent and maintained relations with the Chinese.²⁷ This show of solidarity enhanced China’s bond with Africa and led to increased diplomatic ties and economic growth in the 1990s. China currently has diplomatic relations with 51 out of Africa’s 55 states, with embassies in all except Somalia.²⁸

China’s fourth hard interest on the continent is to minimize Africa’s ties to Taipei. China’s efforts to erode Taiwan’s international legitimacy began in 1970. In 2006, China released its Africa Policy document that stated in order to conduct relations with China a state must end any official relations with Taiwan.²⁹ This caveat was significant as the state’s One China principle took precedence over the no-strings attached policy it still employs with African states.³⁰ China’s economic persuasive power has left the Republic of China with only four small allies on the African continent: Burkina Faso, The Gambia,

²³ William Davison, “Africa Rising: China Steps up Production in Ethiopia with Drill Instructors, Investors,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, 3 April 2012, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2012/0403/Africa-Rising-China-steps-up-production-in-Ethiopia-with-drill-instructors-investors> (accessed 4 April 2013).

²⁴ Rooyen and Solomon, “The Strategic Implications of the US and China’s Engagement within Africa,” 8.

²⁵ Alden et al., *China Returns to Africa*, 8.

²⁶ Steven C. Y. Kuo, “Beijing’s Understanding of African Security: Context and Limitations,” *African Security* 5, no. 1 (Jan-Mar 2012): 30.

²⁷ Taylor, *China’s New Role in Africa*, 13.

²⁸ Senate, *China’s Role in Africa*, 5. Since this hearing South Sudan gained its independence in July of 2011 bringing the total number of African states to 55 and the total number diplomatically tied to China to 51.

²⁹ Government Accountability Office, *Sub-Saharan Africa*, 15.

³⁰ Alden et al., *China Returns to Africa*, 8.

Swaziland, and Sao Tome and Principe.³¹ Even though these smaller states possess little in the way of power, officials in Taiwan are concerned China may make a move to further strain these current alliances.³² Although the United States has defended Taiwan against Chinese military aggression, disputes between Beijing and Taipei, short of violent conflict, should not get in the way of a cooperative effort between the United States and China. If China wants to continue its pursuit of these four interests in East Africa, the region will need continued assistance with further development and stability efforts.

United States' Interests in East Africa

Although Africa may be of greater strategic importance to China, the United States is expanding its interests in East Africa and throughout the continent.³³ The addition of Africa Command as the sixth geographic combatant command in 2008, combined with significant increases in humanitarian aid, demonstrate a shift in the United States strategic interests in the region. In a statement before the Congressional Subcommittee on African Affairs, Stephen Hayes, President of the Corporate Council on Africa said, “I believe that our political and economic engagement with Africa is in our highest national interests.”³⁴ Although this was a bold statement, there are significant interests in the East African region that support his comment. In 2012, the Obama Administration’s documented strategy for sub-Saharan Africa stated, “the United States will partner with sub-Saharan African countries to pursue the following interdependent and mutually reinforcing objectives: (1) strengthen democratic institutions; (2) spur economic growth, trade, and investment; (3) advance peace and security; and (4) promote opportunity and development.”³⁵ Inside these four objectives are two strategic interests of the United States and two areas of policy that help direct the achievement of those interests. Economic growth and national security are key American interests and the focus of this section. The desire to strengthen democracies and promote development best

³¹ Rooyen and Solomon, “The Strategic Implications of the US and China’s Engagement within Africa,” 7, Alden et al., *China Returns to Africa*, 7, and Taylor, *China’s New Role in Africa*, 28.

³² “Strengthening Ties with Africa,” *Taipei Times*, 8 May 2012, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2012/05/08/2003532298/2> (accessed 20 February 2013).

³³ Taylor, *China’s New Role in Africa*, 162.

³⁴ Senate, *China’s Role in Africa*, 28.

³⁵ The White House, *U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington, DC: Office of the President, June 2012), 2.

explain American policy and will be elaborated on in the next section of the domestic sphere. These two primary interests are intertwined and not easily separated.

“East Africa,” according to Mwangi Kimenyi, director of the Africa Growth Initiative at the Brookings Institution, “is becoming a more favored destination for investment and a potential source of energy supplies for the United States.”³⁶ American leaders perceive the state’s national security is closely tied to its ability to gather energy supplies.³⁷ New discoveries of oil and natural gas in the East African region are of significant interest to the United States. In 2005, the United States imported 1.8 billion barrels of oil per day from sub-Saharan Africa, which accounted for eighteen percent of the nation’s daily consumption.³⁸ Petroleum products are the largest sector of trade between the United States and Africa, totaling eighty-eight percent of the imports received during the first half of 2012.³⁹ Although the United States is not as dependent on African oil as China, any disruption in either production or shipment, from piracy off the Horn of Africa or conflict along the transportation routes, can impact the global price of petroleum. Additionally, as third world nations increase their appetite for energy resources the importance of newly emerging sources for oil increases. If demand for petroleum grows without an associated increase in supply, increases in oil prices can seriously impact economic growth.

Much like China, the United States is striving for new markets to trade its manufactured goods in order to stimulate a stagnant economy. As a developed nation, the United States is struggling to balance a rising trade deficit. From 2001 to 2011, imports accounted for 80 percent of the United States growth in total trade.⁴⁰ During this same period, the value of U.S. exports to sub-Saharan Africa increased only slightly, from \$6.8 billion to \$20.3 billion.⁴¹ One part of this problem is that American firms are often unwilling to accept the risk of investing in the oil and gas sectors of East Africa due to

³⁶ Sarah McGregor, “Clinton’s East Africa Trip Focuses on Oil, Somalia, Security,” *Bloomberg BusinessWeek*, 2 August 2012, <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-08-02/clinton-s-east-african-trip-focuses-on-oil-somalia-and-security> (accessed 23 April 2013).

³⁷ McGregor, “Clinton’s East Africa Trip Focuses on Oil, Somalia, Security.”

³⁸ Taylor, *China’s New Role in Africa*, 162.

³⁹ “U.S. Trade with sub-Saharan Africa, January-June 2012,” United States Department of Commerce, http://www.agoa.gov/build/groups/public/@agoa_main/documents/webcontent/agoa_main_003964.pdf

⁴⁰ Government Accountability Office, *Sub-Saharan Africa*, 19.

⁴¹ Government Accountability Office, *Sub-Saharan Africa*, 24.

corruption, a lack of regulation, and political instability.⁴² The second driving issue is that policy makers have overlooked the true potential for growth in the region.

Political leaders are slowly recognizing the significance of boosting trade with Africa. In 2011, the United States' support from Export-Import Bank and Overseas Private Investment Corporation almost tripled, rising from just over one billion dollars in investment to 2.6 billion dollars.⁴³ This increase in government loans, depicted in Figure 5, demonstrates a significant change in policy to support American firms in the high-risk sub-Saharan Africa region. “This reprioritization of U.S. goals,” according to the Government Accountability Office, “reflects this region’s prospects for economic growth as well as the perspective that advancing United States interests can benefit from a stronger integration of commercial goals with diplomatic engagement.”⁴⁴

Aside from oil production, East Africa contains several areas of concern for United States’ national security. “Today the United States government is primarily concerned with curbing international terrorism and ensuring energy security for the United States economy . . .” according to Jan van Rooyen and Hussein Solomon, “. . . the focus in Africa has been shifted towards the role played by weak and failed countries that foster terrorism and terrorist networks.”⁴⁵ In East Africa this focus moved to thwarting piracy in the Horn of Africa, dismantling the Al Qaeda-associated terrorist organization Al Shabaab, and helping dispose of the Lord’s Resistance Army. For the United States, these transnational threats are detrimental to regional stability, economic growth, and other state interests.⁴⁶ In order to create a long-term solution for the challenges in East Africa, a plan for stability and development must be at the forefront of any governmental policy.

China’s Policy

In contrast to the 1950s and 1960s, China does not appear to be a revolutionary power in any sense of the term. China abandoned its earlier goal of spreading communism throughout Asia and no longer adheres to Marxist-Leninist-Maoist


⁴² Government Accountability Office, *Sub-Saharan Africa*, 58.

⁴³ Government Accountability Office, *Sub-Saharan Africa*, 33.

⁴⁴ Government Accountability Office, *Sub-Saharan Africa*, 67.

⁴⁵ Rooyen and Solomon, “The Strategic Implications of the US and China’s Engagement within Africa,” 12.

⁴⁶ The White House, *U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa*, 1.



Source: GAO analysis of data from U.S. Ex-Im and OPIC.

Figure 6. United States government loans and related financing committed for American made products and firms' investments in sub-Saharan Africa, 2001-2011

Source: *Government Accountability Office analysis of data from United States Export-Import and Overseas Private Investment Corporation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Trends in U.S. and Chinese Economic Engagement, GAO-13-199 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, February 2013), 34.*

ideology.⁴⁷ Chinese policy today is primarily focused on economic growth in order to satisfy its self-interests. China's 2010 white paper on national defense established a position that through economic strength developing countries will be able to achieve greater international influence and change the status quo to a multipolar system.⁴⁸ China intends to assist this change in East Africa through bilateral agreements focused on trading infrastructure development for economic gains. China takes an individualized

⁴⁷ Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?" *International Security* 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 28.

⁴⁸ Information office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "China's National Defense in 2010," 31 Mar 2011, 3, http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/_node_7114675.htm (accessed 15 January 2013).

approach to engagement by matching its level of cooperation to a partner's potential to enhance China's economic strength.⁴⁹

Although trade between China and Africa dates from the 10th century BC, China's current diplomatic ties with Africa only began in the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung.⁵⁰ During the conference, China introduced the "Five Principles of Mutual Coexistence" as its foreign policy for non-communist developing nations. These five principles for Africa were: "1.) respect for territorial integrity; 2.) rejection of aggression; 3.) non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; 4.) equality and mutual benefit; and 5.) peaceful coexistence."⁵¹ Since these principles were introduced, China's leaders have maintained the original message's nature of peace and development. In 1996, President Zeming espoused similar principles during his visit to Africa, focusing on "sincere friendship, equality, solidarity and cooperation, common development and being oriented to the future."⁵²

One of the main principles China has abided by since the 1960s is developing financial aid programs that "require less investment but yield quicker results."⁵³ Chinese leaders recognize that "backward infrastructure is the bottleneck that hinders the development of many African countries" and place infrastructure construction as a high priority in financial aid.⁵⁴ In the 1970s, China built the 1,860 kilometer Tanzania-Zambia railway, and, since then, its construction efforts have expanded to over 500 projects ranging from ground transportation, airports, seaports, telecommunications, power networks, water systems, and hospitals.⁵⁵ China is showing no sign of slowing down its infrastructure development. During the 2012 Forum for China-Africa Cooperation, the Chinese government doubled its previous pledge for infrastructure and other development in Africa to \$20 billion and allocated \$5 billion from the China-Africa Development

⁴⁹ Kohli, "The Dragon on Safari," 7.

⁵⁰ Kohli, "The Dragon on Safari," 1.

⁵¹ Helmut Asche and Margot Schuller, *China's Engagement in Africa: Opportunities and Risks for Development* (Eschborn, GE: Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), 2008), 14.

⁵² Padraig Carmody, *Globilization in Africa: Recolonization or Renaissance?* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), 17.

⁵³ Kuo, "Beijing's Understanding of African Security," 29.

⁵⁴ People's Republic of China, "China-Africa Economic Trade Cooperation," Attaching Importance to Infrastructure Construction, <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/index.htm>, (accessed 15 January 2013).

⁵⁵ People's Republic of China, "China-Africa Economic Trade Cooperation," Attaching Importance to Infrastructure Construction.

Fund to subsidize Chinese business investments in agriculture, infrastructure, and natural resource sectors.⁵⁶ As a further show of China's commitment to helping Africa develop, China gifted the \$200 million African Union Headquarters, which opened in January of 2012 as the tallest building in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.⁵⁷ China recognizes infrastructure development as a tangible means to improve access to resources as well as enabling further economic development for Africa. Although this action assists African countries, it also helps supply the underemployed Chinese domestic population with work.

China's policy in Africa is also based on exporting business and workers to maintain domestic stability. China seeks to enter untapped markets and employ its population at home and abroad. Chinese state-owned enterprises enable businesses to enter markets deemed too risky by Western standards.⁵⁸ Unlike many American oil companies, Chinese business leaders were willing to enter Sudan during the mid-1990s. Amidst the violent conflict taking place in the state, Chinese oil companies were able to boost production from 2,000 barrels per day in 1993 to 490,000 barrels per day by 2009.⁵⁹ Additionally, Chinese business ventures are often subsidized by the government, enabling them to succeed more often in free-market competition with lower bids.⁶⁰ As Chinese businesses increase, the number of Chinese workers continues to rise. In 2009, the state had an estimated 800,000 Chinese citizens living and working in Africa in the manufacturing and construction industry.⁶¹ Although the number of workers is large, the ratio of local to Chinese workers may not be as skewed as some sources suspect. Deborah Brautigam, Professor and Director, International Development Program, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, estimated from her research that on average the true ratio is around one Chinese worker for every four local workers on a

⁵⁶ Government Accountability Office, *Sub-Saharan Africa*, 17.

⁵⁷ "African Union Opens Chinese-Funded HQ in Ethiopia," *British Broadcasting Corporation*, 28 January 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16770932> (accessed 20 February 2013).

⁵⁸ Kuo, "Beijing's Understanding of African Security," 25.

⁵⁹ Angelia Sanders and Maya Moseley, "Emerging Energy Resources In East Africa," Civil-Military Fusion Centre Mediterranean Basin Team, September 2012, [https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/medbasin/Holder/Documents/r020%20CFC%20Monthly%20Thematic%20Report%20\(13-SEP-12\).pdf](https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/medbasin/Holder/Documents/r020%20CFC%20Monthly%20Thematic%20Report%20(13-SEP-12).pdf) (accessed 22 April 2013).

⁶⁰ Government Accountability Office, *Sub-Saharan Africa*, 58.

⁶¹ Kohli, "The Dragon on Safari," 4.

project.⁶² Additionally, unlike Western workers who earn 10 to 20 times more than a typical African salary and stay in relatively luxurious hotels, Chinese workers live frugally off the economy, often residing in compounds.⁶³

Although China has kept its interests in economic gains at the forefront of policy, there are signs that it is expanding development outside of infrastructure alone. As of 2009, China assisted in 107 school projects on the continent and awarded 29,465 African students with scholarships to study in China.⁶⁴ Health care is another development area China has expanded. Since this program began in 1963, China claims to have sent 18,000 medical personnel to assist over 200 million patients throughout 46 sub-Saharan countries.⁶⁵ Additionally, as of 2009, China has built 54 hospitals, created 30 malaria treatment centers and distributed anti-malaria drugs to 35 different countries throughout the continent.⁶⁶ Much like its infrastructure development, China provides these services in the form of loans unless the state is unable to pay for healthcare through trade.⁶⁷

Another major characteristic of Chinese policy in Africa is its willingness to deal with any state with mutual interests. The state's no-strings-attached policy to financial aid and economic cooperation has given China open access to material resources where Western states are restricted from conducting business due to violations of international norms and governance expectations.⁶⁸ This policy serves a dual purpose. Part of this action stems from China's unwillingness to meddle with another country's sovereignty as a post-colonial nation and part is from its desire to gain economic advantage from the situation.

⁶² Deborah Brautigam, "Africa's New AU Building: How Many Chinese Workers?" *China and Africa: The Real Story*, 30 January 2012, <http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/2012/01/africas-new-au-building-how-many.html> (accessed 20 February 2013).

⁶³ Senate, *China's Role in Africa*, 13.

⁶⁴ People's Republic of China, "China-Africa Economic Trade Cooperation," Strengthening Building of Development Capacity, <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/index.htm>, (accessed 15 January 2013).

⁶⁵ David H. Shinn, "United States-China Collaboration on Health and Agriculture in Africa," (paper presented at a joint conference hosted by The Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington) and the China Institute of International Studies (Beijing), Beijing, China, 24 May 2011), <http://www.scribd.com/doc/56154100/United-States-China-Collaboration-on-Health-and-Agriculture-in-Africa>.

⁶⁶ People's Republic of China, "China-Africa Economic Trade Cooperation," Helping to Improve People's Livelihood, <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/index.htm>, (accessed 15 January 2013).

⁶⁷ Shinn, "United States-China Collaboration on Health and Agriculture in Africa."

⁶⁸ Rooyen and Solomon, "The Strategic Implications of the US and China's Engagement within Africa," 10.

In terms of multilateral efforts, China's policy and past behavior are in conflict. According to the state's 2010 Whitepaper on National Defense, China ascribes to the idea that "pulling together in the time of trouble, seeking mutual benefit and engaging in win-win cooperation are the only ways for humankind to achieve common development and prosperity."⁶⁹ Furthermore, as its political leaders wrote in the 2010 White Paper on China-Africa Economic Trade Cooperation, "China would like to work with other countries and international organizations to enhance consultation and coordination with African countries, participate in the construction of Africa, and jointly promote peace, development and progress in Africa."⁷⁰ However, the political leaders' words and actions have not always aligned. Instead of multilateral efforts, China signed 44 bilateral agreements with African states to pave the way for enterprise cooperation.⁷¹ Additionally, "China has thus followed a singularly bilateral oil strategy," according to Jan van Rooyen, "preferring to negotiate and work directly with oil producers and host governments as opposed to buying from and working within multilateral frameworks established to ensure global oil security."⁷² Although China prefers bilateral engagements for economic interests, the timing may be right for open discussions on multilateral stability operations.

United States Policy

The United States policy for achieving its interests differs greatly from China. The United States places greater emphasis for development efforts in Africa on health care, education, and humanitarian aid over that of infrastructure. During the George W. Bush administration, foreign aid to Africa more than tripled, including a five-year, \$15 billion President's Emergency AIDS Relief Plan.⁷³ This trend towards human development in Africa continued under the Obama Administration. "In 2010," according to the Government Accountability Office, "health assistance and humanitarian aid were

⁶⁹ Information office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "China's National Defense in 2010," 3.

⁷⁰ People's Republic of China, "China-Africa Economic Trade Cooperation," Forward, <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/index.htm>, (accessed 15 January 2013).

⁷¹ People's Republic of China, "China-Africa Economic Trade Cooperation," Expanding Mutual Investment Fields, <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/index.htm>, (accessed 15 January 2013).

⁷² Rooyen and Solomon, "The Strategic Implications of the US and China's Engagement within Africa," 6.

⁷³ Alden et al., *China Returns to Africa*, 172.

the largest categories of development assistance in sub-Saharan Africa.”⁷⁴ Furthermore, in his fiscal year 2012 bilateral budget request for foreign aid to Africa, which was 27 percent of the \$29.1 billion requested for global bilateral aid, President Obama allocated 74 percent towards “investing in people” with only 15 percent going to economic development.⁷⁵ Programs incorporated in this budget request included human resource aid to sub-Saharan Africa for Feed the Future and the Global Health Initiative, which was created in 2009 to combine the fight against HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tropical diseases.⁷⁶ Additionally, five of the top ten recipients of humanitarian aid in Africa in 2012 reside in East Africa: Kenya (\$751.4 million), Ethiopia (\$608.3 million), Tanzania (\$571.9 million), Uganda (\$527.8 million), and Sudan (\$518.3 million).⁷⁷




Figure 7. The FY2012 bilateral aid request for Africa by program area \$ millions

Source: FY2012 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations Notes: Does not reflect aid funding administered by agencies other than the State Department and USAID. Does not include humanitarian aid, most of which is not requested on a bilateral basis and is allocated during the year according to need.

⁷⁴ Government Accountability Office, *Sub-Saharan Africa*, 31.

⁷⁵ Alexis Arieff et al., *U.S. Foreign Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa: The FY2012 Request* (Congressional Research Service, 20 May 2011), 1, 4, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41840.pdf>.

⁷⁶ Government Accountability Office, *Sub-Saharan Africa*, 14.

⁷⁷ Arieff et al., *U.S. Foreign Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa*, 3.

Unlike China’s no-strings-attached policy, the United States places greater restrictions on the states it chooses to provide with development and humanitarian aid. Congressional acts such as the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, and the Religious Freedom Act of 1998 require developing states to meet basic criteria before receiving financial support. “Measures in both annual appropriations and long-standing authorization requirements to curtail or deny aid because of a failure of the recipient state to meet standards in human rights, weapons proliferation, anti-terrorism, illicit narcotics trafficking, religious freedom, and trafficking in persons,” as stated by the Government Accountability Office, “can weigh heavily on U.S. bilateral aid to Africa.”⁷⁸ The Millennium Challenge Corporation, created in 2004 to reduce poverty through economic growth, provides financing to a small number of well governed states to accelerate their potential for economic growth.⁷⁹ The United States also works to provide incentives for free trade and capitalist markets. In 2000, Congress signed the African Growth and Opportunity Act into law in order to promote open economies across the African continent.⁸⁰

Nested with financial aid, the United States’ policy in the East African region is based on advancing democracies and strengthening governance. “The dominant Western perspective for promoting peace and security in Africa,” as Steven Kuo noted, “is the liberal peace project, which is underpinned by universal values of human rights, multiparty democracy, privatization, open and free markets, and good governance.”⁸¹ The White House espoused the linkage between democratic governance and development stating “sustainable, inclusive economic growth is a key ingredient to security, political stability, and development, and it underpins efforts to alleviate poverty, creating the resources that will bolster opportunity and allow individuals to reach their full potential.”⁸² United States leaders consider a direct link between “good governance and

⁷⁸ Government Accountability Office, *Sub-Saharan Africa*, 8.

⁷⁹ Alden et al., *China Returns to Africa*, 172.

⁸⁰ Government Accountability Office, *Sub-Saharan Africa*, 11.

⁸¹ Kuo, “Beijing’s Understanding of African Security,” 26.

⁸² The White House, *U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa*.

democratic accountability” as a method of stability and prevention of future acts of terrorism in Africa.⁸³

The United States cannot be characterized as a unilateral or multilateral actor. It has approached its form of action in different ways, depending on each independent situation. “The Bush Administration was more unilateral regarding the environment and security considerations,” William Zartman and Saadia Touval noted, “but it was not more unilateral regarding multilateral economic initiative and human rights interventions.”⁸⁴ Fiscal constraints, compounded from two long wars and a weak economy, placed the United States in a position for greater multilateral efforts. In a 2011 speech, Dr. Esther Brimmer, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, said “... U.S. development strategy recognizes that by working multilaterally, American leadership and resources can leverage a greater global effort to address the root causes of poverty advanced through country-led plans.”⁸⁵

Interstate Sphere

The interstate relationship between the United States and China, albeit fractured at points throughout history, is one of the most important state interactions of this century. The ability to cooperate as great powers in the maintenance of international order and stability relies on their relationship. Inside the interstate sphere, political leaders’ perception of reciprocity and longevity are contributing factors in determining the potential for a cooperative agreement. This section bases the longevity analysis of state interactions on two interdependent relationships: the expected duration of interaction between the United States and China, and the inclination of these two states towards long-term relations with East Africa. Since the potential for a cooperative effort centered on development and stability in East Africa hinges on the United States and China, a brief historical analysis of the relationship and examples of previous reciprocity is important.

Reciprocity

⁸³ Rooyen and Solomon, “The Strategic Implications of the US and China’s Engagement within Africa,” 12.

⁸⁴ Charles Doran, “The Two Sides of Multilateral Cooperation,” in *International Cooperation*, 47.

⁸⁵ Dr. Esther Brimmer, “Revitalizing the United Nations and Multilateral Cooperation: The Obama Administration’s Progress,” delivered at the Brookings Institution February 1, 2011, <http://geneva.usmission.gov/2011/02/02/multilateral-cooperation-brimmer/> (accessed 20 February 2013).

Relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China have varied between conflict and cooperation since the middle of the twentieth century. In an effort to thwart Japan from conquering the Asia Pacific region during World War Two, the United States placed its support behind Chiang Kai-shek and his Chinese Nationalist party. American leaders provided training, equipment, and legitimacy for the Nationalist regime in China. After the war ended, President Truman lobbied for and won a permanent seat on the newly formed United Nations Security Council for China. He designed this move to strengthen ties between allies in the East and West. Although Chiang Kai-shek was the recognized leader of China, the war left the state fractured. After the repatriation of Japanese forces from mainland China, civil war between the Nationalist and Chinese Communist Parties that had begun in 1927 but halted after the Japanese invasion, commenced with greater vigor. In 1949, Mao Zedong's communist guerillas, supplied by the Soviet Union, ousted the Nationalists from mainland China, forcing them to flee to the island of Formosa.⁸⁶ Although the Chinese Communist Party controlled mainland China, the Nationalist Party formed the government of Taiwan and maintained the permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council with United States support.

The United States recognition of Taiwan and its presence in the Pacific region created conflict between the two powers. In the fall of 1950, China perceived the United States' intervention in the Korean War and General MacArthur's drive to the Yalu River, which geographically separates China from North Korea, as a direct threat to China's sovereignty.⁸⁷ Although China and the Soviet Union supported North Korea with supplies and equipment, this perceived threat drove China to engage in direct combat with the United States. As the Korean War progressed, the alliance between the Soviet Union and China began to collapse, as Chinese leaders saw the need for greater self-reliance due to waning Soviet support.⁸⁸

The cleavage between the Soviet Union and China created the opportunity for Sino-American negotiations. Although the United States' entry into the Vietnam War in

⁸⁶ Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2011), 90.

⁸⁷ Xiaoming Zhang, *Red Wings over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War in Korea* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 76.

⁸⁸ Zhang, *Red Wings over the Yalu*, 208.

1965 once again provoked the Soviet Union and China into another proxy war, diplomatic negotiations in the 1970s lowered the fear of direct intervention by China.⁸⁹ On 26 October 1971, the United Nations General Assembly, in opposition to the United States, voted 76 to 35 (17 states abstained) to replace the seat held by the Nationalist government in Taiwan with the People's Republic of China.⁹⁰ Once the world recognized Beijing as the legitimate government of China and concurred with its one China policy, the Nixon administration shifted its China policy away from Taipei.⁹¹ In February of 1972, President Nixon met with Mao Zedong, opening the door for cooperative efforts against Soviet expansion along with greater economic trade and exchanges in technology.⁹² While these discussions showed great promise, the turmoil from Nixon's resignation over Watergate and Mao's death hampered the level of cooperation between the two states. As the threat of the Soviet Union diminished in the 1980s, relations between the United States and China shifted from alignment against the Soviet Union towards cooperation in areas of common interest.⁹³

This transition did not occur without setbacks. On 4 June 1989, China employed soldiers and tanks to dissolve student-led protests for political reform. The military action at Tiananmen Square, which killed 155 Chinese citizens and wounded 65 more, was a clear violation of human rights.⁹⁴ Although newly-elected President George H. W. Bush attempted to mend the cleavage created by China's domestic actions, Kissinger noted, "by the fall of 1989, relations between China and the United States were at their most fraught point since contact had been resumed in 1971."⁹⁵ After the violation of human rights, the United States placed China on notice that it might remove its Most Favored Nation status, which enables countries outside of the World Trade Organization to apply

⁸⁹ Stephen Randolph, *Powerful and Brutal Weapons: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Easter Offensive* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 193.

⁹⁰ Tad Szulc, "U.N. Awaits Peking Delegates; Taipei Clings to Affiliate Ties; Rogers Calls Ouster A Mistake," *The New York Times*, 26 October 1971, <http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/1025.html#article> (accessed 10 April 2013).

⁹¹ Kissinger, *On China*, 263.

⁹² Kissinger, *On China*, 262.

⁹³ Kissinger, *On China*, 394.

⁹⁴ Erik Eckholm and David Chen, "Kin of the Dead Seeking Inquiry On Tiananmen," *The New York Times*, 1 June 1999, <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/01/world/kin-of-the-dead-seeking-inquiry-on-tiananmen.html?ref=tiananmensquare> (accessed 10 April 2013).

⁹⁵ Kissinger, *On China*, 421.

tariffs equally among states.⁹⁶ Although President Clinton started off with a hard stance on political reform in China after taking office in 1993, he instead progressed to a strategy of constructive engagement and did not enact economic punishments due to the importance of Sino-American relations.⁹⁷ President Clinton's ability to decouple human rights from economic policy highlights the idea that reciprocity may not be required as an overall policy for cooperation to exist.⁹⁸ Where interests intersect, short-term cooperative efforts developed between the two great powers. Outside of economic engagements, China and the United States have demonstrated that reciprocity can exist in limited venues of diplomatic and security areas as well.

In the realm of diplomacy, a tacit cooperative agreement between the United States and China over the status of Taiwan exemplifies reciprocity. China, aside from the rhetoric of leaders in the People's Liberation Army, continues to pursue a peaceful unification of mainland China with Taiwan. Although the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 committed the United States to the defense of Taiwan in the case of Chinese aggression, American leaders are committed to a peaceful One China policy.⁹⁹ When Taiwan attempted to gain entrance into the United Nations in 2007, the Bush Administration opposed its bid and remained committed to a peaceful unification.

China has also demonstrated further signs of reciprocity through military cooperation unseen in the past. China, a major proponent of nonintervention, has taken a more active position in helping provide stability on the Korean peninsula. "China's role in multilateral efforts to cope with the North Korean proliferation problem," Avery Goldstein noted, "marked a significant change for Beijing."¹⁰⁰ Additionally, in the aftermath of civil war in Liberia, which ended in 2003, the United States and China cooperated to help control the spread of malaria in the region and build a military

⁹⁶ Hugh Arce and Christopher Taylor, "The Effects of U.S. MFN Status on China Office of Economics Working Paper: U.S. International Trade Commission," July 1997, 1, http://www.usitc.gov/publications/docs/pubs/research_working_papers/ec9702a.pdf (accessed 10 April 2013).

⁹⁷ Kissinger, *On China*, 469.

⁹⁸ Alan Alexandroff, "China and the World Trade Organization: Can Economic Engagement Triumph over Containment?" in *The New Great Power Coalition: Toward a World Concert of Nations* ed. Richard Rosecrance (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 352.

⁹⁹ Shirley Khan, *China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 35.

¹⁰⁰ Avery Goldstein, *Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 122.

barracks in the city of Bonga.¹⁰¹ Additionally, in September of 2012, the United States Navy and People's Liberation Army-Navy conducted a bilateral counter-piracy exercise off the coast of Somalia.¹⁰² This exercise, the first ever between the two great powers, focused on bilateral interoperability to stabilize shipping routes in the region and enhance counter-piracy capabilities.

These smaller efforts are confidence-building measures that lay the groundwork for negotiating broader cooperative agreements. Similar to Axelrod's belief that a smaller cooperative relationship can instigate broader cooperation where reciprocity did not previously exist, smaller engagements between great powers are the confidence-building measures that provide the foundation for greater reciprocity.

Longevity

As the international environment evolves, the relationship between the United States and China will likely continue to deepen. Economic interdependence of the two great powers is showing no signs of slowing down. From 2002 to 2012, United States' exports to China increased by \$88.5 billion, while imports from China increased an astonishing \$300.4 billion.¹⁰³ The United States' dependence on cheaper goods to sustain its capitalist market, combined with China's drive for economic growth, fueled this symbiotic relationship. In 2012, the United States' trade deficit with China reached \$315.1 billion, up from \$103.1 billion in 2002.¹⁰⁴ Even with such a large deficit, few foreign policy advisors or political elite are calling for an end to the United States' policy of economic engagement with China.¹⁰⁵ If anything, the economic interdependence along with the resultant diplomatic discussions provide further opportunity for cooperation as the two states compete. There are promising signs that, as China rises economically, it will also take a greater part in sustaining international order.

¹⁰¹ Shinn, "United States-China Collaboration on Health and Agriculture in Africa."

¹⁰² USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG81) Public Affairs, "US and China Team Up for Counter-Piracy Exercise," 18 September 2012, United States Navy, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=69643 (accessed 10 April 2013).

¹⁰³ Extrapolation of 2002 and 2012 trade data, United States Census Bureau, "Trade in Goods with China," United States Department of Commerce, <http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html> (accessed 20 March 2013).

¹⁰⁴ United States Census Bureau, "Trade in Goods with China."

¹⁰⁵ Justin Logan, "China, America, and the Pivot to Asia," *CATO Institute: Policy Analysis*, 8 January 2013, 5.

Some of these interactions are beginning to spill over into diplomatic and security relations. As President Obama noted in the National Security Strategy, “disagreements should not prevent cooperation on issues of mutual interests, because a pragmatic and effective relationship between the United States and China is essential to address the major challenges of the 21st century.”¹⁰⁶ Although China maintains a long-standing policy of non-intervention, its 2010 whitepaper on national defense espoused it will abide by “new security concepts of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, advocates the settlement of international disputes and regional flashpoint issues through peaceful means . . . opposes acts of aggression and expansion, and opposes hegemony and power politics in any form.”¹⁰⁷ As China’s economic and military growth edge the international order closer to a bipolar system, the longevity of great power relations will most likely increase.

For the United States, national security combined with great potential for economic growth and development in the East African region has sustained the relationship. “With six of the world’s fastest growing economies in the past decade, combined with democratic gains made in a number of African nations in 2011,” General Carter Ham stated before the House Armed Services Committee in 2012, “Africa’s strategic importance to the United States will continue to grow.”¹⁰⁸ Additionally, America’s placement of Africa Command’s only military base on the continent in East Africa demonstrates its commitment to national security and development in the region. Recent discoveries of oil and natural gas, combined with the need for economic expansion, will fuel even greater long-term American interests in the region.

There is no prospect of retrenchment from East Africa for China either. The linkage between economic growth and domestic stability requires Chinese political leaders to find external markets for resources and manufactured goods. East Africa’s increasing market for energy extraction and developing markets provide the combination of economic resources China seeks over the long-term.

¹⁰⁶ President, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: Office of the President of the United States, May 2010), 43.

¹⁰⁷ Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, “China's National Defense in 2010.”

¹⁰⁸ United States Africa Command, *Statement of General Carter Ham: United States Africa Command before the House Armed Services Committee*, 29 February 2012, 2, <http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/testHam04052011.pdf>.

International Sphere

The international sphere, albeit less critical than the domestic sphere in conflict management, still exerts pressure on the decision to pursue great power cooperation. In the world of international politics, image matters, and the position great powers portray through relations with specific nations can influence future international agreements. For a cooperative effort to develop, both Chinese and American leaders must perceive their prestige and legitimacy will increase or, at a minimum, remain neutral over the long-term. Difficulties in predicting international opinion on this matter stem from the fact that allies of each state may perceive a multilateral cooperation as detrimental to their common values. Additionally, weaker nations could perceive such actions by great powers as an opportunity to exploit East African nations for individual gains, thereby increasing the disparity between regional hegemons and developing nations. Although the ability to measure international prestige and legitimacy is quite nebulous, the perceptions of each state must not be discounted when determining the potential for great power cooperation in East Africa.

China's Prestige

China has the potential to make significant gains in prestige in the international environment from a cooperative effort with the United States. Since China's *century of humiliation*, which began during the Opium War with Britain in 1839 and ended after World War Two, the state has worked continuously to restore its greatness.¹⁰⁹ This period of national struggle, according to Friedberg, "appears to have left China's leaders and its people acutely sensitive to perceived slights to national honor and prestige and especially alert to threats around their periphery."¹¹⁰ In the 1990s, China took a hit in prestige when the United States barred the state's entry into the World Trade Organization and Group of Seven until China demonstrated, "greater progress toward liberal democracy and free markets."¹¹¹ Additionally, in 1996, China launched a number of missile tests and military exercises off the shores of Taiwan designed to convince the Taipei government to back

¹⁰⁹ Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, "Prestige Matters: Chinese and Russian Status Concerns and U.S. Foreign Policy," *International Security*, Policy Brief, April 2010, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20090/prestige_matters.html (accessed 20 April 2013).

¹¹⁰ Friedberg, "The Future of U.S.-China Relations," 20.

¹¹¹ Larson and Shevchenko, "Prestige Matters."

down its rhetoric on becoming an independent state. In response, the United States sent two aircraft carrier battle groups through the Taiwan Strait as a show of force to convince leaders in Beijing to de-escalate their rhetoric. These actions ultimately embarrassed Chinese leadership and resulted in a perceived loss of Chinese prestige.¹¹²

Since this period, China has worked diligently to restore its image as an influential great power. In 2003, China placed its first man in space to help demonstrate its rise and to seek, among other things, greater international prestige. “So while space activity for the sake of ‘prestige’ is sometimes scoffed at,” Joan Johnson-Freese acknowledge, “prestige that translates into increased political status and gives countries a voice in regional and even global affairs that they might not otherwise enjoy is a new form of geopolitics.”¹¹³ China’s advances in stealth aircraft, aircraft carriers, and anti-access/area-denial technology is also advancing its prestige as a military force capable of power projection. Although China is constantly advancing its prestige on a technological and economical level, it can gain value on a social level as well.

In order to further its standing in the international community, China needs to demonstrate it can cooperate with great powers to enhance stability and order. One of the major sticking points is China’s unwillingness to tie financial aid and development to Western ideas of good governance and democratic reforms.¹¹⁴ China’s bilateral agreements with individual East African nations isolate the international community from its actions. Additionally, China’s unwillingness to disclose its foreign assistance or government loans to the African region promotes a lack of transparency in the international environment. These actions spurred some East African nations, such as Kenya, to publish annually information on financial aid provided by the Chinese government for state projects.¹¹⁵ In order to achieve its goals of a peaceful rise and a shift from a unipolar to a multipolar world, China needs to advance its prestige and demonstrate it is capable of a more significant role in the international community.

However, China’s policy must seek to appease both strong and weaker states. It must continue to satisfy authoritative regimes with its no-strings-attached policy in order

¹¹² Kissinger, *On China*, 476.

¹¹³ Joan Johnson-Freese, *Space as a Strategic Asset* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 170, 205.

¹¹⁴ Kuo, “Beijing’s Understanding of African Security,” 28.

¹¹⁵ Government Accountability Office, *Sub-Saharan Africa*, 66.

to maintain access to resources while at the same time demonstrate to the major states that it is continuing a peaceful rise. As mentioned earlier, China established itself as an ally of developing nations in the battle against former Western colonial powers. China's struggle takes shape in its need to balance against Western powers, while at the same time collaborating with weaker states to gain international status. As Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko noted, ". . . strategic dialogues, formal summits, and strategic partnerships can help to establish agendas for future collaboration and symbolize that states are political equals.¹¹⁶ As long as a cooperative effort in East Africa allows China to maintain its identity aside from Western democratic reforms while enhancing its prestige, an agreement is more likely to succeed.¹¹⁷

United States' Prestige

A cooperative effort with China in East Africa will most likely result in neither an increase nor a decline in American prestige. As the strongest great power, a cooperative agreement may demonstrate explicit acceptance of China's coequal status in the region and further promote its role in great power management of the international system. The willingness of the United States to refrain from unilateral action and establish a cooperative agreement also has the potential to increase its prestige among other powerful nations. Additionally, the inclusion of a multilateral effort between great powers directed at improving development and stability in East Africa demonstrates a use of American power for the greater good of international society.

However, the same action with China may reduce the prestige of the United States if its democratic allies see this cooperative effort as aiding and abetting an adversary. China's lack of transparency and its expanding military capability leave many nations at a crossroads as they attempt to determine if the rising state is a friend or foe to the international community. Some nations could see the cooperative effort as the United States bowing to China and relinquishing their hegemonic position while at the same time spurring China's economic growth. Cooperation could send mixed messages to allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. In the Pacific, the decision to sell F-35s, the United States' latest fifth-generation stealth fighter, to Singapore, Japan, and Australia sends a

¹¹⁶ Larson and Shevchenko, "Prestige Matters."

¹¹⁷ Larson and Shevchenko, "Prestige Matters."

strong message that China is a potential long-term threat in the region.¹¹⁸ A cooperative arrangement with China may cause these allies to rethink their relationship with the United States and pursue other alliances. Additionally, for Western democracies in Europe, the idea of the United States entering a great power cooperative effort with an authoritarian state may weaken the prestige it gives the democratic hegemon in future relations. The interconnectedness of United States diplomatic relations ultimately leads to a net balance of equal gains and losses for international prestige.

Legitimacy

A great power cooperation focused on increasing stability in East Africa can provide greater legitimacy for both the United States and China. Legitimacy, as defined in Chapter Two, is the ability for a state to pursue its interests in a manner that is acceptable to the overall international community. Increases in legitimacy depend not only on how well state actions correlate to international norms but also how well they coincide with regional efforts. For this reason, the analysis of a state's perceived gains in legitimacy from cooperative effort in East Africa must be evaluated on a state, regional, and international level.

For China to maintain legitimacy in East Africa, it must continue to convince state leaders that it is interested in their development and not solely extracting resources for economic gains. “During their years of development,” as stated in China’s Whitepaper on the China-Africa Economic Trade Cooperation, “China and Africa give full play to the complementary advantages in each other’s resources and economic structures, abiding by the principles of equality, effectiveness, mutual benefit and reciprocity, and mutual development, and keep enhancing economic and trade cooperation to achieve mutual benefit and progress.”¹¹⁹ Although Chinese leaders tout these ideas publically and support them with financial aid, dissent among the African population could derail its economic progress in the region. The negative impacts from state closures of Chinese-built hospitals, schools, and roads due to unsafe conditions reinforce the idea of a one-sided

¹¹⁸ Colin Clark, “Singapore Poised to Announce Purchase of 12 F-35Bs,” *Aol Defense*, 25 March 2013, <http://defense.aol.com/2013/03/25/singapore-poised-to-announce-purchase-of-12-f-35bs/> (accessed 20 April 2013).

¹¹⁹ People’s Republic of China, “China-Africa Economic Trade Cooperation,” Forward.

arrangement.¹²⁰ Additionally, China's growth in exports to the region is showing signs of damaging local economies. For example, the flood of cheap goods into Ethiopia forced the closure of several domestic businesses, leading its Chamber of Commerce to actually request intervention from Western powers.¹²¹ Great power cooperation for stability and the establishment of internationally accepted norms and expectations might demonstrate China's concern for the region.

China needs support from African states in order to sustain its economic growth and reestablish a multipolar international structure. Although China remains a developing nation, the combination of its size, economic power, and permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council enables it to provide a nexus between developed industrialized nations and the developing world.¹²² The bond China created with its no-strings-attached policy and economic aid enables it to gain support from smaller African nations while protecting them from institutional constraints. As one of five member states with veto power on the United Nations Security Council, China protected both Sudan and Zimbabwe from Western-sponsored sanctions.¹²³ In essence, China provides smaller states with a voice on the international stage in return for legitimacy.

After more than ten years of war, the United States is in need of legitimacy as a world leader. The inability to garner United Nations' support for the war in Iraq ultimately damaged America's international legitimacy. Although this damage may have strained a few international relations, because of its power and diplomacy the United States has proven quite resilient in its recovery. As Edward Luck noted, "more than any other major power, the United States has displayed a repeated willingness to stand virtually alone in international forums if its interests, principles, or domestic politics so dictated."¹²⁴ American leaders are able to partake in unilateral action without significant fear of weaker states cooperating together to balance against it. In order to maintain the ability to pursue unilateral action for specific objectives, the United States needs to

¹²⁰ "Trying to Pull Together: Africans are Asking Whether China is Making their Lunch or Eating It," *The Economist*, 20 April 2011, <http://www.economist.com/node/18586448> (accessed 18 February 2013).

¹²¹ Taylor, *China's New Role in Africa*, 64.

¹²² Rooyen and Solomon, "The Strategic Implications of the US and China's Engagement within Africa," 8.

¹²³ Alden et al., *China Returns to Africa*, 122.

¹²⁴ Edward C. Luck, "The United States, International Organizations, and the Quest for Legitimacy," in *Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement*, ed. Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 51.

cooperate in areas where interests intersect. The ability to balance gains and losses of legitimacy in the international community is important. A cooperative effort in East Africa that coincides with the interests of China, regional institutions, and the international community without sacrificing its principles can provide a net gain in legitimacy for the United States.

In great power cooperation, it is important to demonstrate to the region that the United States and China are not ganging up on the developing nations for individual advantage. “There is a suspicion among some African officials,” according to former United States Ambassador to Ethiopia David Shinn, “that any cooperation by the United States and China is not in the best interest of the African country. These officials prefer to negotiate individually with donor countries so that they have maximum leverage and more options.”¹²⁵

East African leaders recognize the need for economic growth and development as a stabilizing force in the region. According to a 2010 assessment by the World Bank, the East African region had the lowest scores on quality of infrastructure and logistical competence in the world.¹²⁶ The East African Community recognized the correlation between economic development and logistical competence in the prioritization of infrastructure development in its 2011-2016 development strategy.¹²⁷ Although the East African Community was created to “strengthen their economic, social, cultural, political, technological and other ties for their fast balanced and sustainable development,” inside its five-state organization, leaders recognize the need for foreign state support to expand growth.¹²⁸ Additionally, the institution recognizes the importance of governance and democracy in the region, as instability from perennial conflicts is promoting the cycle of instability in East Africa.¹²⁹

The African Union is also set on development in East Africa. Its mission statement is to be “an efficient and value-adding institution driving the African

¹²⁵ Shinn, “United States-China Collaboration on Health and Agriculture in Africa.”

¹²⁶ East African Community, “EAC Development Strategy (2011/12 – 2015/16): Deepening and Accelerating Integration,” August 2011, 27, http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=155&Itemid=163 (accessed 20 March 2013).

¹²⁷ East African Community, “EAC Development Strategy (2011/12 – 2015/16),” 26.

¹²⁸ Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community (As amended on 14th December, 2006 and 20th August, 2007), 3, <http://www.eac.int/>.

¹²⁹ East African Community, “EAC Development Strategy (2011/12 – 2015/16),” 14.

integration and development process in close collaboration with African Union Member States, the Regional Economic Communities and African citizens.”¹³⁰ Four of the African Union’s 12 strategic objectives include goals to “promote sustainable economic development . . . promote sustainable social and human development . . . build and foster continental and global cooperation . . . promote good governance, democracy and human rights . . .”¹³¹ Additionally, The New Partnership for Africa’s Development, a program inside the African Union, has been working on further infrastructure and social development. Three of the seven Presidential Infrastructure Champion Initiative projects for 2010-2015 are based on building roads and fiber optic network technology in the East African region.¹³² These institutions are not only on board with advancing development and stability in Africa, they also recognize the need for international support to achieve their objectives. A cooperative effort between China and the United States based on providing this support can further their legitimacy as world leaders.

Conclusion

Areas of discord between the United States and China can be overcome to establish a cooperative effort for development and stability in East Africa. Although the assessment of a great power cooperation based on the framework presented in Chapter One is not predictive, it suggests enough connections exist to warrant further examination. Of the six characteristics evaluated in the three spheres of pressure, five show potential connections between China and the United States. The overall observations of this analysis is summarized in Table 2 below. The similarities of great power interests combined with the regional stability industry required in East Africa to achieve these interests provide significant opportunity for a multilateral effort.

In the Domestic Sphere, key interests are aligned between China and the United States whereas policy is disconnected. “Although these two countries do not share all of the same intentions on the continent,” Rooyen and Solomon stated, “they are both engaging in Africa for the salient purpose of securing access to Africa’s bountiful

¹³⁰ African Union, “Vision and Mission,” <http://www.au.int/en/about/vision> (accessed 20 March 2013).

¹³¹ African Union Commission, “Strategic Plan 2009-2012,” http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Strategic_Plan2009-2012.pdf (accessed 20 March 2013).

¹³² The New Partnership for Africa’s Development, 2011 Annual Report, 41, <http://www.nepad.org/system/files/NEPAD%202011%20Annual%20Report%20-%20FINAL.pdf> (accessed 20 March 2013).

resources.”¹³³ Stability in East Africa can facilitate greater extraction of resources and increases in economic trade provide a common ground between American and Chinese interest and the potential for a cooperative agreement. A lack of coordination on developmental actions could hinder economic progress whereas a combined effort to increase export capacity in Africa could advance the United States’ and China’s exports to the region.¹³⁴ Development and stability in the region is a key ingredient for continued economic gains from the export of manufactured goods for the two great powers.

Differences in policy are significant between China and the United States, but these differences can be resolved. China’s no-strings-attached policy is in direct conflict with the United States’ pursuit of democratic growth and sustainable governance in the region. Additionally, Chinese financial aid is focused primarily on infrastructure development, while the United States is focused more on human development. Another significant difference in policy is how the two great powers fund foreign aid. Whereas China primarily provides financing in the form of loans, the United States offers direct grants.¹³⁵ However, as United States Agency for International Development officials noted, “China’s funding of infrastructure projects, through loans and grants, complements the U.S. government’s focus on aid for poverty reduction.”¹³⁶ Although the policies between the great powers do not perfectly align, there is a potential that a holistic effort focused on development and stability may help produce a cooperative agreement.

In the interstate sphere, reciprocity and longevity exist between the two great powers. Although the Sino-American relationship has been rocky at times, the two states have demonstrated areas of reciprocity since the early 1970s. These areas of reciprocity remain limited to specific agreements in economics, peace operations, and minor military events. The fact that a cooperative effort based on providing development and stability to East Africa is outside of the two great powers’ spheres of influence increases the potential for reciprocity to take place.

¹³³ Rooyen and Solomon, “The Strategic Implications of the US and China’s Engagement within Africa,” 2.

¹³⁴ Senate, *China’s Role in Africa*, 12.

¹³⁵ Government Accountability Office, *Sub-Saharan Africa*, 39.

¹³⁶ Government Accountability Office, *Sub-Saharan Africa*, 63.

As for longevity, the relationship between the United States, China, and East Africa will continue into the foreseeable future. The economic and diplomatic interconnections between China and the United States drive the longevity of this relationship. As for East Africa, China has maintained relations in the region since the 1950s, and American relations with the region are growing in importance each year. Additionally, recent discoveries of oil and natural gas inside the East African region will cause the two great powers to maintain significant ties to the region.

In the international sphere, both China and the United States need prestige and legitimacy to sustain their ability to pursue self-interests. For China, its support of poorly governed states through its no-strings-attached policy has damaged its image in the eyes of Western powers. Additionally, faulty construction and an encroachment on African businesses in the region have hurt its favorability in some regions of East Africa where it is seen as a state out solely for its own interests. A cooperative effort with the United States has the potential to garner international prestige as a coequal power. As for the United States, damages from a perceived unilateral action in Iraq can be mended through greater cooperation within the international community.

Although both states seek economic gains in the region, a cooperative agreement based on development and stability is in line with the goals of both regional and international institutions. Not only do states in the region recognize the linkage between development and economic growth, but the East African Community, African Union, and United Nations place great emphasis on development in the region. The ability for China and the United States to partner alongside these organizations in a cooperative agreement not only enhances the two great powers' potential for economic gains but also provides legitimacy for their actions.

Table 2. Cooperative framework between China and United States in East Africa

	Likeliness	China	United States
Domestic Sphere	Potential to Coincide		
Interests	YES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Natural resources (oil production) • Export market for manufactured goods • International influence • Reduce regional influence of Taiwan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Natural resources (oil production) • Export market for manufactured goods • Elimination of violent extremist organizations
Policy	NO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development of infrastructure • No-strings attached • Bilateral engagement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Human development • Liberal democracy • Multilateral engagement
Interstate Sphere	Coincide		
Historical Relationship of Reciprocity	YES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevention of Soviet hegemony • Tacit agreement on one China policy • Security outside two states spheres of influence 	
Longevity	YES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic interdependence • Permanent members of the Security Council • Potential changes to international order 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resources and trade exports • Peace, security, and resources
International Sphere	Coincide		
Prestige	YES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social gains to solidify role as a global power 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Neutral
Legitimacy	YES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mutual development versus self-interest • Partner in world governance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Balance against losses in legitimacy from unilateral action

Source: Author's own work

Conclusion

The appropriate label for the Sino-American relationship is less partnership than “co-evolution.” It means that both countries pursue their domestic imperatives, cooperating where possible, and adjust their relations to minimize conflict. Neither side endorses all the aims of the other or presumes a total identity of interests, but both sides seek to identify and develop complementary interests. The United States and China owe it to their people and to global well-being to make the attempt.

Henry Kissinger, *On China*

As the international environment changes and new powers rise, cooperation is required to maintain international order and stability. Political leaders in the United States and China need to find areas for great power cooperation that complement their individual competitive aims. This does not mean that cooperation will exist on all levels; however, it is important for the two states to establish confidence-building measures to foster potential areas of greater cooperation. Changes in the global economic and security environment have uncovered new areas for testing such efforts. Globalization is interconnecting weaker states, which in the past had little strategic value, to great powers at an increasing rate. The best example of this is found in the East Africa, and the timing is right for great power cooperation based on stability and development for the region.

American leaders are at a crossroads in determining how to deal with Chinese expansion. The ultimate political decision is reliant on how peaceful China’s rise as a great power will be. The introduction of this paper presented three options to maintain United States hegemony and prevent China from shifting the international environment to a bipolar structure. American leaders could execute a preventative war with China while it still has the power, slow China’s growth through trade and diplomatic restrictions, or outpace China in economic growth. However, none of these three options is feasible. An all-out war with China would not only reduce the power of both nations but create instability in the international order. Although war is implicit in the first option, any attempt to slow China’s economic growth would most likely be perceived as a threat to Chinese national security and lead to war as well. The third option is unattainable due to the economic advantages of backwardness which China has as a developing nation.

Higher labor costs, social entitlements, and greater regulation prevent the United States from outpacing China's growth. If political leaders rule out these three courses of action, the United States' best option may lie in finding common ground where the two great powers can work together to maintain international order while pursuing their individual self-interests.

For such an agreement to exist, both states must find benefits in a cooperative effort which exceeds the costs of acting alone. The purpose of Chapter One was to define cooperation, explain the incentives motivating individual states and great powers to cooperate, and present a cooperative framework to evaluate potential areas for combined efforts. This chapter provided three hypotheses for potential great power cooperation to emerge. First, an intersection of interests that does not threaten an individual state's ability to sustain its position in the international order must exist. Second, mutual gains of both great powers must be seen as having a neutral or positive effect on their security. Third, great power cooperation is easier to establish if the interests of states coincide outside of their perceived spheres of influence and do not threaten long-term security.

Harmony, discord, and cooperation characterize the differences international relations. While harmony is a rarity wherein states gain mutual benefit from unintentional actions, most international relations exist between a sliding scale of discord and cooperation. States are enticed to move from discord to cooperation by four main reasons: to reduce economic and political costs, increase international legitimacy of their actions, establish standards of behavior, and increase transparency among states. For great powers, the conservation of power and the need to maintain international order are additional incentives for cooperation. This chapter combined these incentives into a cooperative framework to assess the potential for great power cooperation.

Political leaders engaged in deliberating a potential cooperative agreement often sustain conflicting pressures from domestic, interstate, and international spheres. Inside the domestic sphere, states leaders face the need to achieve self-interests in line with national policy. For cooperation to exist outside of crisis management, this is the most influential sphere in a political leader's decision-making process. The interstate sphere, which is best described as the relationship between the core cooperative states, revolves around a history of reciprocity and the perceived longevity of the relationship. The final

sphere focuses on how the international community outside of the cooperative core views the effort. The international sphere is based on the perceived prestige and legitimacy that each state will either gain or maintain from cooperation. The ability for the United States and China to form a cooperative effort is based on the timing of events, the distance an effort is from national security policy, and the ability for both states to balance the domestic, interstate, and international spheres.

East Africa is currently at a tipping point between significant economic growth and a spiral of instability. Chapter Two presented a synopsis of the current issues contributing to the region's cycle of instability along with several interests on which the United States and China could capitalize on a cooperative effort. Although many state leaders and institutions in the region are pursuing stability and development, East African states need outside support to achieve this goal. Explosive population growth, a lack of food security, poor governance, violent conflict, and criminal activity such as piracy, are hindering stability and economic growth in the region. However, unlike in previous decades, East Africa's strategic value is increasing for both the United States and China. Natural resource exploration in the region is uncovering significant oil and natural gas deposits. Additionally, the booming population growth combined with demographic shifts towards a larger working age population creates a potential market for greater trade of manufactured goods in the region.

Although cooperation has existed on certain levels in East Africa, significant efforts have failed in the past. The purpose of Chapter Three was twofold. It validated the cooperative framework presented in Chapter One as an explanatory tool and assessed why cooperation between the United States and France failed to prevent the genocide in Rwanda. The case study on Rwanda highlighted three concepts on great power cooperation: the domestic sphere is critical during conflict resolution, timing matters, and preventative action may cost less than post-crisis efforts. Inside the domestic sphere, neither interests nor policy aligned between the United States and France. While French leaders saw value in Rwanda as a cultural and economic trade partner, American leaders had little strategic interest in the country. With the images of Somalia fresh in their minds, United States' politicians were unwilling to expend significant resources on a cooperative effort. The interstate sphere was also incongruent. The competitive nature and Anglo-

Francophone divide excluded a strong tie to reciprocity in the region. Inside the international sphere, neither state perceived substantial gains in international prestige or legitimacy from a cooperative effort based on increasing stability in Rwanda. Although no sphere highlighted great potential for cooperation, the lack of congruence in the domestic sphere between the interests and policy of the two states was the main causal factor in the failure to cooperate.

The primary argument put forth in Chapter Four is that the environment in East Africa has changed, and great power cooperation based on increasing stability and development in the region meets both the United States' and China's strategic aims. Inside the domestic sphere, the two great powers' most significant interests align in the region. Chinese and American leaders recognize the economic potential that exists in East Africa. Although the United States and China are competing for these resources and developing markets, both states need stability and development in the region to achieve their interests.

The policies by which the two great powers work to achieve these interests differ. China is focused primarily on infrastructure development and a no-strings-attached policy for distributing financial aid loans. Its willingness to ignore human rights violations, governmental corruption, and to work with autocratic regimes opens its businesses up to more areas in East Africa. The United States, on the other hand, limits its financial grants for development in states seeking liberal democratic values and those which place an importance on human rights. In terms of development in the region, the United States focuses the majority of its efforts on human relations through education and health. Although the two great powers' policies don't align, there is room for complementing efforts. Great power cooperation could enable a combined approach where China focuses on the expansion of infrastructure while the United States spearheads human development in the same area. The domestic sphere, which is the most significant influence on a cooperative effort during conflict management, shows positive signs for great power cooperation.

The interstate sphere, which examined the level of reciprocity and longevity of the great powers relationship, showed positive signs for cooperation as well. While China and the United States have maintained a contentious relationship throughout history,

when issues have arisen that threatened national security, the two powers demonstrated willingness to cooperate. The arrangement in the 1970s to prevent Soviet hegemony during the Cold War and the decision to remain economically engaged with China, despite human rights violations in the 1980s, demonstrate a potential for reciprocity. Since East Africa remains outside of the powers' main spheres of influence and regional stability is beneficial to both, the chance of cooperative effort succeeding is promising. Additionally, the longevity of the two great powers' relationship, along with their growing proclivity to East Africa, further boosts the odds of favorable great power cooperation.

Internationally, a cooperative effort based on stability and development has the potential to increase both prestige and legitimacy for China and the United States. As long as a cooperative effort falls in line with the goals of the East African Community, the African Union, and the United Nations, both great powers gain. For China, a cooperative effort with the United States would not only boost the state's standing as a co-equal partner, but demonstrate it is ready for a more significant role in sustaining international order. This action could also help provide legitimacy to the state as it pursues self-interests in the region. Although the United States will not make great gains in prestige or legitimacy and could potentially lose face for partnering with China, such an effort could help the state rebound from earlier losses caused by unilateral action in Iraq.

The analysis provided in Chapter Four demonstrates that the potential for great power cooperation in East Africa is high and needs further examination. As 2014 approaches and the United States draws down its combat forces from Afghanistan, a renewed focus on stability and development has the potential to produce great benefits. Ten years of war has brought on the harsh reality that conflict prevention may cost less than military intervention after the fact. Additionally, the demand for reductions in government spending abroad places greater emphasis on cooperation as a continuation of diplomatic relations. As Chinese and American leaders, much like the French in Rwanda, recognize they cannot support development in East Africa unilaterally, the fusion of state resources and efforts can better enable the two powers to achieve mutual benefits as they pursue individual interests.

If political leaders recognize incentives are great enough to establish confidence-building measures through great power cooperation in East Africa, further study is required. A potential cooperative effort should be examined with three areas in mind: on which state should the effort focus, what causal factor of instability should the cooperation involve, and what mechanism should the two great powers use.

Analysts from both powers must determine which states in the region are the lynchpins to regional stability and provide the greatest potential for a cooperative effort. The center of instability in East Africa is Somalia, and its domestic problems spill over into bordering states. Although the two powers have less interest in this state, if the region's ground zero for instability is not addressed either directly or indirectly, the cycle of chaos will likely not end soon. There is significant potential for a cooperative effort based in Kenya or Ethiopia to attack the stability problem indirectly in Somalia. These two states border Somalia and are forced to deal with the refugees and crime that spills over from the failed state. Additionally, these two states may provide the best opportunity for stability in the region. Kenya has the largest economy in East Africa and, despite its own internal struggles, has remained a relatively stable state when compared to its neighbors. Ethiopia is growing, and the establishment of the African Union's Headquarters at Addis Ababa demonstrates a greater trend of progress in the state.

Researchers must also examine the best way each power can contribute to stability and development. Such an effort may not be a duplication of developmental efforts, but complimentary actions within a holistic cooperative agreement. The United States proclivity towards human development combined, with China's desire to boost infrastructure development, could create a synergistic effect if well planned. This type of planning requires a holistic approach to the region where specialists must examine the needs of specific areas and states to infuse the right combination of financial and humanitarian aid to the area. It also requires the two states to communicate between their individual efforts to ensure one state is not implementing stability measures that are counterproductive to the overall development of the region.

Potential great power cooperation between the United States and China could take many different forms. State leaders must work to develop a cooperative mechanism that is not only beneficial to the two states, but acceptable to the East African states and

institutions operating there. As previously mentioned, China is a proponent of bilateral negotiations. The best example of this is the counter-piracy efforts between the United States and China off the Horn of Africa. Although both states cooperate with other nations in the area, China is only willing to work on bilateral engagements with the idea it could gain greater leverage than it could through a multilateral effort. This concept needs to be addressed and learn if the potential for great power cooperation based on multilateral efforts with individual states, regions, or institutions is acceptable to China. Additionally, dialogue must be opened to understand what type of norms and standards of behavior could be established through a cooperative effort. Although human rights and democratization are significant parts of America's foreign policy, the emphasis on these principles may need to be relaxed slightly to facilitate such an effort.

The main determinant for great power cooperation between China and the United States in East Africa relies on whether the political leaders of the two states take an optimistic or pessimistic view of future relations. For the pessimists, Joseph Grieco pointed out, "states . . . worry at the extreme that today's friend may be tomorrow's enemy in war, and thus states fear that achievements of joint gains that advantage a friend in the present might produce a more dangerous potential foe in the future."¹ For political leaders more inclined to an optimistic outcome between China and the United States, Deborah Larson and Alexei Shevchenko argued, "effective and flexible readjustment of the international hierarchy of prestige to accommodate rising great powers can hold the key to international peace and stability and may, therefore, be in the hegemonic state's interests."² Although the future of international relations between China and the United States is hard to predict, the only way to gain insight into each other's intentions and diffuse the fears that exist is to test the water through increased interactions and mutually-benefiting cooperative efforts.

¹ Joseph M. Grieco, *Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), 28.

² Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, "Status Concerns and Multilateral Cooperation," in *International Cooperation: The Extents and Limits of Multilateralism*, ed. I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 188.

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